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THE DEFINITION OF MAGIC.

(1) Magic is, at the present day, condemned by science, morality and religion.

By science it is condemned as a means : magic simply does not do what it professes to do.

By morality it is condemned just so far as its ends are morally wrong : whether it is an efficacious means to those ends is a question which does not concern morality ; and if the ends are, as in a minority of cases (those designated sometimes as White Magic) they may be, morally inoffensive or even praiseworthy, no moral question arises as to the means ; and magic then is not morally offensive, however silly it may be from the point of view of the intellect.

By religion it is condemned as a means, so far, and only so far, as it has recourse to the aid of evil spirits, or so far as it is practised by those who have communications with them. Its ends also are condemned inasmuch as no permissible ends can be the real intention of evil spirits.

(2) But though magic is now condemned by science, morality and religion, it has in past times succeeded in allying itself with each of them.

Medicine and alchemy or chemistry are sciences which have only comparatively recently disengaged themselves from magic.

Witch-finding and exorcism are processes of a magical nature which the moral sense of the community practising them strongly approves of.

Magic was incorporated, with the minimum of necessary change, into religion in Babylonia, Assyria, Egypt, and elsewhere.

(3) The connection of magic with science is explained by Dr. Frazer (*History of the Kingship*, p. 38) : " Magic is a spurious system of natural law as well as a fallacious guide of conduct, a false science as well as an abortive art." " The views of natural causation embraced by the savage magician no doubt appear to us as manifestly false and absurd ; yet in their day they were legitimate

hypotheses, though they have not stood the test of experience" (p. 91). "Regarded as a system of natural law, that is, as a statement of the rules which determine the sequence of events throughout the world, it (magic) may be called Theoretical Magic: regarded as a set of precepts which human beings observe in order to compass their ends, it may be called Practical Magic" (p. 39). Magic, as a system of natural law, is based on two principles of thought, which in their day were legitimate hypotheses: "first, that like produces like; and, second, that things which have once been in contact continue to act on each other even after the contact has been severed" (p. 37). From this it seems to follow—though I am not sure whether Dr. Frazer would admit the consequence—that magic would not arise until the idea began to dawn on men that these two principles of thought were not legitimate hypotheses. So long as they were believed legitimate and regarded as a system of natural law, there was no magic in them: they were simply a statement of the rules which determine the sequence of events throughout the world. It was when suspicion—well-founded suspicion, as eventually appeared—began to fall upon them, that they began to be illegitimate, and—as illegitimate—magical. On this view, Dr. Frazer's theory shows us the origin of magic by taking us back to a period when the belief in magic did not exist, and points out how, and out of what, it grew up.

Further, on Dr. Frazer's view, magic preceded religion: it was when and because magic did not act successfully, that man concluded there were powers which could not be constrained by magic and which therefore must be supplicated. The belief in such powers was or became religion.

Differing from Dr. Frazer, Mr. L. T. Hobhouse (*Morals in Evolution*, vol. ii. ch. 1 and 2) holds that magic is not prior to religion. Mr. Hobhouse considers that the categories (of substance and attribute, quality and relation, identity and difference) which for primitive thought are "interwoven in wild confusion," are eventually distinguishable and essentially distinct, even if primitive man has not yet distinguished them.

So too, assuming that magic and religion at the outset are interwoven in wild confusion, it follows that magic is not (as Dr. Frazer holds) prior to religion, and either that magic and religion are eventually distinguishable and essentially distinct, or that magic and religion are really to the end and in their essence, indistinguishable. In the latter case then, they are not interwoven by primitive man in wild confusion but are recognised by him for what

they are found (by civilised man) really to be, viz., essentially the same thing. This view, which is contradictory to the assumption that magic and religion are things distinct from one another but confused together by primitive man, is consistent with and implied by the statement that "magic and religion are not in their working fundamentally opposed" (ii. p. 23).

But whether magic and religion are essentially the same thing must (on this view) be settled by consideration of them as they present themselves to the mind of civilised man. The fact (if it is a fact) that they present themselves to the mind of primitive man in wild confusion will not suffice to show that they are really indistinguishable, for to him other things also (substance and attribute, etc.) are wildly confused which to us are quite distinguishable and essentially distinct.

The assumption of an essential and fundamental distinction between magic and religion, which distinction is obscured from the view of primitive man by his wild confusion, is consistent with the view that the two ideas "do not at once emerge into clear consciousness—the mind uses them long before it is clearly aware of them" (Hobhouse, ii. 25).

The real question is whether magic and religion are things distinct and fundamentally opposed or not. We must answer that question one way or the other before we can decide whether primitive man was guilty of wild confusion of thought or not guilty.

If there is a distinct and fundamental opposition, then it may be granted that it did not at once emerge into clear consciousness, and that the mind felt the distinction dimly and obscurely long before it became clearly aware of the distinction. The early history of religion will then be concerned with tracing the way in which the confusion of primitive thought was dissipated.

But if magic *is* religion and religion is magic, then primitive man saw or felt from the beginning the truth—a truth which, though seen by some modern thinkers, is considered by most to be no truth but a wild confusion. If primitive man, so far from being guilty of confusion of thought on this point, was right in feeling the identity of magic with religion, then the continued struggle of religion to assert a difference between magic and religion has been a movement of error, of retrogression, not of progress: the fundamental identity of magic and religion is a fact—and Dr. Frazer is wrong in maintaining that there is a fundamental opposition between them.

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(4) The connection of magic with religion seems, however, in some cases clearly to be that a relation of opposition exists between them. But magic and science, which also come to be opposed to one another, were not originally opposed or even distinguished, if Dr. Frazer's view be correct. It is therefore a possible conjecture that magic and religion, like magic and science, only come to be differentiated from one another in the course of their evolution from a common source. That is the view which seems to be held—or to be intimated—by MM. Hubert and Mauss (in *L'Année Sociologique*, vol. vii., "Esquisse d'une théorie générale de la Magie"). The common source from which both magic and religion spring is the notion (to which Dr. Codrington first called the attention of students) which is designated by the Melanesian word *mana*—a word which, it seems, applies in Melanesia both to magic and to religious rites, to spirits both religious and magical.

This conception introduces us at once to two facts which Dr. Frazer's theory of magic tends to ignore. The first is the belief in spirits or demons; the next is that the magician is believed to have power to do magic, whether we call that power *mana*, with the Melanesians, or *orenda* with the Hurons, or whether we seek for its explanation elsewhere. The belief that some persons have the power to do magic—persons with the evil-eye, hunchbacks, one-eyed men, women, strangers, foreigners and enemies—is a belief which at certain stages of social evolution is shared by all members of a society: it is not a freak of some one individual's fancy, nor a belief which, though entertained by the ignorant majority, is seen by an enlightened few to be a spurious system of natural law. It is a collective belief, a sociological fact. It is the collective belief of society as a whole, at a certain period of its growth, that certain persons have the power to do marvellous things—a power which is mysterious, and not the less so because it is usually exercised in secret. Amongst the marvellous things which the magician can do, at times, is to command spirits: demonology to some extent, or in some of its aspects, undoubtedly comes within the province of magic. Demonology is of course quite distinguishable from mimetic and sympathetic magic; but like them, in the opinion of MM. Hubert and Mauss, it has its root in the notion of *mana*, or power which may manifest itself as the power exercised by the magician, as the power appertaining to the rite, or as the power of spirits or demons. The *mana* power manifested in these three ways is rather differentiated than different

from the *mana* which is manifested in religion. The differentiation of *mana* into magic and religion took place so early in the growth of society that MM. Hubert and Mauss do not undertake to give us instances of it; but it is, I presume, similar to the differentiation of magic and science, which in the case of medicine and alchemy was not completely effected until very late times. Finally MM. Hubert and Mauss admit that but few instances of the explicit belief in *mana* are known to us; but that, they say (p. 116) "ought not to make us doubt that it has been universal." Indeed they go so far as to say (p. 118) "we have a right to conclude that everywhere there has existed a notion which includes that of magical power." This conclusion is one, I should say, which yet requires proof.

(5) The connection between magic and religion, which is treated by MM. Hubert and Mauss from the point of view of Sociology, has also recently been examined by Wundt from the point of view of Psychology, in vol. ii. part ii. of his *Völkerpsychologie*. I will approach his theory by making two references to MM. Hubert and Mauss. First, Wundt takes primitive man's conception of the soul as the starting point for his theory of magic; while they, on the other hand, consider the notion of spiritual force as anterior, in magic at least, to the notion of soul (p. 106). This would seem to imply—but I may be wrong—that a belief in magic, in the spiritual force or *mana* of the magician himself, of the rites of mimetic and sympathetic magic, and of spirits or demons, is anterior to the notion of soul. If this interpretation of MM. Hubert and Mauss is correct, then the French view and the German view are diametrically opposed, and we have to choose between them. On the one view the notion of soul is absolutely essential to the origin of the belief in magic; on the other it is essentially irrelevant, for the belief in magic (and in spirits or demons) is anterior to the notion of soul. The other reference I have to make to MM. Hubert and Mauss indicates an important point of agreement between them and the great German psychologist: the magician's belief in his own powers is, MM. Hubert and Mauss say, "the reflex" of the community's belief (p. 96). That is to say, first, the community believes that magic and marvels are done; next, that they are done by someone; then that the someone is this or that person; and finally this or that person himself believes that he had and has the power of doing the thing.

Wundt's theory calls upon us at the start (p. 180, n. 1) to reject Dr. Frazer's view of magic. Dr. Frazer attributes to primitive

man a theory of causation (that like produces like, that things originally connected act on each other even when no longer in contact): magic is based upon "the views of natural causation embraced by the savage magician." But if primitive man has no theory of natural causation and no conception of cause in our sense of the word, Dr. Frazer's view of magic collapses: it proceeds upon an inversion of the actual, historical, order of the facts. Primitive man, in fact, Wundt says, has no notion of natural causation. For him events are familiar or surprising, ordinary or extraordinary, normal or abnormal, expected or unexpected, natural or unnatural, and therefore comprehensible or incomprehensible. Natural, ordinary, common-place events excite no surprise, and do not stimulate thought or attention: they call for no explanation, and are accepted, without any theorising, just as they happen. It is the surprising, unexpected occurrences which attract attention and demand to be accounted for. Now, primitive man has only one way of accounting for things: if something happens, somebody did it. Man has the power to do things. This remarkable thing therefore which has happened was done by some man. What is further remarkable about it is that, whereas in the ordinary course of things a man is seen to do what he does do, in this instance nobody was seen to do it. The man who did it was therefore keeping out of the way and was at a distance. How he did it is mysterious, and the thing itself is disquieting and alarming. What is certain—on a *priori* grounds—is that somebody did it: therefore he had the power to do it, and he did it mysteriously, from a distance. An event thus brought about is a marvel: so long as it is supposed to be brought about by a man, it is a piece of magic; when it is ascribed (as, according to Wundt, in later, but not in primitive times, it is ascribed) to a god, it is a miracle.

It is therefore the marvellous and mysterious things, sudden changes of fortune, especially illness and death, which are ascribed originally to the will and the power of some man at a distance; and in later times to the will and power of a god.

The practical question which was raised by ascribing the marvel to some man was, Who is the man? And Wundt's position is that a man with the evil eye is looked upon with the fear which is quite enough to suggest, He is the man.¹ The soul issues in the

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The origin, then, of the belief in magic, according to Wundt, is to be found in primitive man's *a priori* assumption that man alone does things, that he alone has the power to do things. An event sufficiently striking to arrest attention is accounted for by the satisfactory explanation that somebody did it—unseen, at a distance and mysteriously or marvellously. The power thus to work marvels then differs from the *mana* which MM. Hubert and Mauss invoke, because *mana* resides according to them in spirits or demons and in the magical rites, from the beginning, as well as in man; whereas the power on which Wundt relies is that supposed to reside in the human will, that is, in the human soul, alone.

The question suggests itself: did primitive man believe that man alone does things? Did he not believe that animals and inanimate objects also do things, marvellous things? Wundt's position seems to be that in course of time man came to believe that animals and inanimate objects do things, and marvellous

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things; but that he began first with the first fact in this line known to him, viz., that man does things. Is it the first fact however? May not the first fact man realised have been that things are done to him? He is object as soon as he is subject; it may even be argued that the child suffers, and knows it, before he acts consciously or self-consciously.

Even if we might assume that in primitive man's eyes from the beginning animals and inanimate objects (as we regard them) did wonderful things, the question would arise, however, whether we should properly class them as magical: is it not of the essence of the idea of magic that it is something done by a man? that magic is impossible without a magician? If so, then we have a note or a mark whereby to distinguish one class of marvels from other classes with which primitive man is acquainted. Ghosts, for instance, are marvellous and alarming, but they are not magical when they come of their own free will and for their own ends, though there may be magic in the power which enables the witch to raise them for her own purposes. The same may be said of storms and the spirits of the storm, etc.

It may, therefore, be that from the beginning marvels were worked by animals and inanimate objects and not by man alone; and that the marvels ascribed to the action of some man working in secret from a distance were alone what we term magic.

(6) The relation of magic to morality then becomes a question which admits of discussion, if by magic we understand marvels wrought by a man for his private ends. First, this definition of magic allows us to understand the fact that, though not all magic is necessarily the subject of moral condemnation or of the disapproval of public opinion, still in most cases public opinion does condemn it. Sickness and death are the things which are generally first and most usually ascribed to the operation of magic: and the man who causes them naturally does so for his own ends, and so is marked off for general condemnation as well as for general fear. Next, though the man who works magic does it primarily for his own ends, inasmuch as he has the power to do marvels he may be induced to do them for the public benefit. If he does, and so far as he does so, he enjoys public approval and occupies a public office: he may make rain or secure food or do other desirable things; and the rites employed for such purposes may pass, in course of time, definitely over to religion. There they may be continued as rites which when performed in the traditional way are effective in themselves and do not postulate any magical or

special power in the person performing them beyond his official power as priest: his power is no longer personal but *ex officio*, and thus it differs from that of the man who is a magician, that is to say, who has a power personal to himself which ordinary people have not. It differs also in the fact that it can only act for the public good and cannot be used for personal ends. The power is taken up by the community in its religious character or function, and so is deprived of its anti-social and anti-religious quality. Eventually, the rite for making rain may unite with prayer for rain: indeed it does so amongst very undeveloped peoples. And eventually the rite may be dropped and the prayer alone remain.

But, though morality may, on its own terms, tolerate the employment of magic, no one has ever suggested that magic is the source of morality; and it seems equally improbable to suppose that magic is the source of religion because religion has admitted rites which, on admission, have been deprived of their anti-social character, and eventually have been robbed of their original meaning by the development of the mental attitude of prayer. Indeed, neither the English, French, or German theories of magic, which have been discussed above, take magic to be the source of religion, even if magic develops sooner and more rapidly than religion.

(7) There is then an agreement of opinion that—in the words of Dr. Frazer in his preface (p. xvi.) to the second edition of the *Golden Bough*—there is “a fundamental distinction and even opposition of principle between magic and religion.” The next point on which an agreement between experts is required is whether there is or is not a fundamental distinction and even opposition of principle between magic and science. Dr. Frazer sometimes expresses himself in a way which may be interpreted, or misinterpreted, to mean that magic and science both go back to one principle—that of universal causation—and are only slowly and painfully disentangled and dissociated from one another. But, nevertheless, the general trend of his line of thought makes it clear, I think, that he really believes there is a fundamental distinction and opposition of principle between magic and science. In either case, however, what is the fundamental distinction? It lies in this, that the worker of magic is believed to work his magic because he has a mysterious, incomprehensible power to do so. The relation of magic to science and to religion is that magic undertakes to do the work of both, and to do it by mysterious means superior to those at the command of either. The quality

essential to the magician is the belief that he has the power to do wonders—a belief that must be entertained both by the magician and his clientèle.

The magician may pose as a physician or as a chemist or alchemist; and may claim to have secret and wonderful processes which are akin to science but are of a superior kind because they produce superior results. But in due, if slow, course of time, he and his mysteries are ejected from science, whose canon is that a scientific experiment can always be repeated when the necessary conditions are fulfilled, and that the personal qualities of the person performing the experiment are no part, say, of the chemical equation.

In religion also thaumaturgic powers are claimed by or on behalf of persons who are supposed to have received power to do marvels. It may be held that religion must eventually discard miracles as science has purged itself of magic. Whether this be so or not, however, we must not allow ourselves to forget the fundamental difference between the marvels of magic and the miracles of religion, viz., that the magician works his wonders in virtue of a mysterious power personal to himself, whereas the man of God is believed to do miracles in virtue of divine power bestowed upon him.

One aspect of magic, in regard to which there is agreement between Wundt and MM. Hubert and Mauss (who here follow Codrington's view) is that the magician has power to do wonders, and does them in virtue of the power he possesses. Dr. Frazer, on the other hand, though he admits the power, does not formally place it in the forefront of his explanation of magic. But if there is to be a real and explicit agreement between students as to the nature of magic, it is much to be desired that Dr. Frazer should consider whether there is any insuperable difficulty, from his point of view, in assenting to the proposition that a magician to be a magician must possess this personal power.

A second aspect of magic, on which there must be agreement, if we are to have an accepted theory of magic, is that magic is the power to do extraordinary and marvellous things. Dr. Frazer's position is that magic is a system of natural law, spurious, indeed, but nevertheless a system of *natural* law; whereas other investigators seem agreed that magic is the power to do unusual and abnormal things. Now, the fact seems to be that magic constantly seeks to effect, and frequently succeeds in effecting, an alliance with science and religion, but is finally rejected as spurious by both.

If, therefore, Dr. Frazer would allow us, when he defines magic as "a spurious system of natural law," to understand that he emphasizes the word "spurious" in such a way that magic is "a false science" in the sense that, being false and spurious, it is not science at all; then it may turn out that a general agreement even on this point is not impossible. The avowed object of the magician, we might then agree, is not to bring about natural things in the natural way, but to bring about non-natural things in a way and by virtue of a power personal to himself.

We might then, by general agreement, perhaps go even farther and say that this power produces results which, being abnormal and marvellous, are not so much non-natural as supernatural: it is the power—as Dr. Codrington says of the Melanesian *mana*—which is called in to account for "everything which is beyond the power of ordinary men, outside the common processes of nature." But Dr. Codrington goes further and says, "it is the belief in this supernatural power and in the efficacy of the various means by which spirits and ghosts can be induced to exercise it for the benefit of men that is the foundation of the rites and practices which can be called religious; and it is from the same belief that everything which may be called magic and witchcraft draws its origin." If these words of Dr. Codrington's are understood to imply that magic and religion have a common source, are differentiated from one and the same belief, then we must point out that such interpretation of them is exposed to the same difficulties and objections as is the view that magic and science are derived from a common source—differentiated from one and the same belief. Magic poses, and is often accepted, as a superior way of doing what science or religion does; but eventually it is rejected as being, and as having always been, fundamentally unscientific or irreligious. As Dr. Frazer says, there is "a fundamental distinction and even opposition of principle between magic and religion"; and, though Wundt's *Völkerpsychologie* is not yet completed, I think it would be safe to say that he inclines to the same view. And I would suggest, as a point for consideration, whether agreement is not more likely to be reached, and fruitful results more likely to be attained, if we recognise a fundamental distinction on the one hand between magic and science and on the other between magic and religion.

(9) We may next note that Wundt's theory of Animism differs from the now classical view of Professor Tylor, in that according to Wundt man first believes he had a soul himself, and only after-

wards came to inject, as it were, souls into things. Wundt's magic—his direct magic, that is the action of soul on soul—belongs to what he considers the first and most primitive period of animism.

MM. Hubert and Mauss, on the other hand, assume that, at the beginning, all things were believed to be animate; and they place the discovery of man's soul later than the belief in magic. Thus they differ principally from Wundt: according to their view, direct magic, the action of soul on soul, could not be the earliest form of the belief in magic.

Now, magic deals with extraordinary events; and is the assumption that somebody did them. According to Wundt, that somebody, in the first instance, must have been a living man, (living, I think), and cannot, in the first instance, have been an animated thing. This view of Wundt's, however, seems to be open to some doubt. Let us, therefore, at present regard it as quite legitimate to hold that, from the first, objects (inanimate for us, but living beings for early man) could be the doers of extraordinary things, could be invoked as a possible explanation of extraordinary things, when they happened. Does it follow that the action of objects presented itself as identical in its way of operation with the action of human beings? Did a ghost or a rock when it acted require magic to enable it to act, as a man does when he causes the illness or death of a foe? The probability, I suggest, is that ghosts and spirits do extraordinary things because "it is their nature to"—they are there for no other reason than to do (or to account for) extraordinary things. But ordinary men do ordinary things: only magicians (and then only on exceptional occasions) do exceptional things.

This line of thought tends to the conclusion that it is misleading to group the power of magicians along with that of ghosts or spirits; and that MM. Hubert and Mauss are on a false scent when pursuing *mana* to this extent. On the other hand, Wundt would seem to assume rather than to prove that belief in the power of the magician originated much earlier than belief in the power, or even the existence, of spirits.

Still the fact remains that men, ghosts and spirits are all persons or (more vaguely) personalities; and that all possess their power simply and solely because they are personalities—or rather they are personalities because power is attributed to them; and power is attributed to them because effects are ascribed to them. The argument in all cases is: this extraordinary thing has been done:

who did it? The answer may be "this rock, that ghost, some unknown man." But, whereas no further explanation is required, if the answer be "this rock or that ghost" (for all objects, regarded as personalities, and all ghosts can do extraordinary things); if the answer be, "some unknown—or yonder known—man," then further explanation is needed, and is found in the fact that the man who can do extraordinary things is an extraordinary man. But the ghost or spirit who can do extraordinary things is not an extraordinary ghost: all ghosts and spirits do marvels—that is what they are there for. A man is a magician who does what ordinary men cannot. Hence the very same marvel, when done by a man is magic; when done by a spirit or ghost, is not. The question then arises whether we are to believe with Wundt that, at the first, marvels were ascribed only to magicians; and that only later were spirits allowed to do, or invoked to account for, wonders. Should we not rather hold with MM. Hubert and Mauss that marvels were put down to the action of ghosts and spirits quite as early as they were to the action of magicians? But though we go so far with MM. Hubert and Mauss, need we go with them further and consider that ghosts and spirits originally did supernatural things only by means of magic, or that magicians originally did their marvels by means of something that was not magic? I trust this will not be regarded as an unfair way of stating their view of *mana*. The only alternative to it that I can see is to say that, from the beginning, ghosts, in order to do their marvels, had no need of magic, whereas man could never work wonders without it. In fine I would suggest that the genius of Wundt has in principle solved the problem of magic by demonstrating that magic is not a later or derived form of some previous conception, whether that of *mana* or that of universal causation, but dates from the earliest time at which man, when astonished or alarmed (say at the illness and death of mother or father) put to himself, or others, the question, Who did it? The answer to that question may carry with it magic, as it does if the answer be "some man, working at a distance and in mystery"; or, if it be that Apollo or Artemis has done this thing, the answer is religious. It is unreasonable to say that because the question is the same there can be no real difference in the answers: even though both answers be wrong, they may be different.

F. B. JEVONS.

THE FAMILY AND THE CITY: THEIR FUNCTIONAL RELATIONS.

I. *The Family as the Growing Point of the Social Structure.*

Leslie Stephen points out that, unlike every other association, the family is fundamental. In whatever special form it may exist, it always has its roots in the same instincts. "The family. . . depends at once upon the most primitive instincts of our nature, which are the direct products of our organic constitution. The love of man and woman or of mother and child constitutes a bond which requires and admits of no further explanation by reference to other emotions. It is, of course, true that other instincts, and indeed every instinct of which we are capable, come to group themselves round this central instinct and strengthen the primitive tie. But that tie is more or less the ground of every other, the antecedent assumption in all human society, and, therefore, not explicable as a product of other modes of association." (*Science of Ethics*, p. 132.) He further adds, after indicating the immense social changes that may follow a change in the family mode, "And thus, from a scientific point of view at least, the family is not in any case the product of the political arrangement, but rather one of the primitive arrangements which determine the nature of the state." (*op. cit.*, p. 133.)

The family thus creates the city; not the city the family. It is a common fallacy to place city and family on the same plane as if they were a larger and a smaller aggregate of the same kind. No mistake can be greater. The internal instincts or external pressures that bring together men into a city, may flow from the primary family instinct; but they are derived from it and do not produce it. It is legitimate to regard the city as a great family; but it is not legitimate to regard the family as merely a reduced city.

The functions of the city are not, as popular belief imagines, antagonistic to the functions of the family or alien to it; on the contrary, they grow out of it. The family instinct is their life-blood, their motive power, their true form, their end.

Our hardened popular conceptions of institutions, as if they were but externally related to each other, will neither serve to unify our social theory, nor justify our social practice. One

cannot help hearing the persistent wail that attends the present rapid transformation of parental responsibility, for example, into a higher form. In the modern world, from before the day when *Social Statics*, appeared, until now, we have not wanted for prophets to explain to us how the bonds of society must loosen and decay when the contemporary ethic of the family proceeds to assimilate new growths. I remember well with what perfect lucidity I seemed to see all Herbert Spencer's final reasons against the incipient movement towards public education, the incipient organisation of life amid the unspeakable welter of city slumdom. Nothing seemed more simple than that school boards were all a mistake, just as sanitary boards and practically all other boards were. The argument, if I remember rightly, went down even to the details of street paving and convinced us how infinitely preferable for the moral good of the individual it would be for him to put down his own part of the pavement rather than accept the same service from himself in his capacity as citizen. And Spencer's clearness of vision, his remorseless pushing of this theory to its limits, did a good service in its day; but, however much he may have affected the individual thinker, he did nothing to stop the movement towards representative institutions and the whole growth of modern local government is, it seems to me, antagonistic to his primary analysis in *Social Statics*. If no logic that admitted his own premises has successfully answered his conclusions, he has nevertheless been answered by the logic of history.

With all that has been said about the importance of the family, its functional service as the infant school of ethics, its primary significance in every society, I have no wish to disagree. Even if I suggest that, at the present moment, the current half-realised conception of the family as an isolated social unit, an atom, has failed, because that conception was itself a fiction, or rather a dissociated hypothesis, I do not, therefore, say that social regeneration from the very same roots is not possible. What has made, will unmake and remake. So long as there is a father, a mother and a child, so long will there be a family capable of creating a new society. So much we may take for granted. Here our point of view is different. What I wish to ask is what the family functionally is in our present civic society.

II. *The immediate end of the Family, and the necessary aggregation of Families in Clan, Village, Town, City.*

The immediate end, or *telos*, of the family as a social molecule is to provide nurture for the child. Whether there be a child or not, it may be an advantage for the man and woman to constitute a unit under the same constancy of obligation as a true family of father, mother and child; but no one can say that the social significance of the obligation is on the same plane of importance in the two cases. Broadly, if there is no child, there is no family. At least, for our purpose, we may take this as the essential point. Broadly, therefore, the immediate end of the family is to provide nurture for the child.

But nurture cannot be provided without adequate mechanism. The primary necessities of the new-born infant are warmth and food. Up to a point, these may both be provided by the mother's person alone; but she in turn demands nurture to keep her fit to be the support of her child. Whatever may have been the case in the early history of mankind, or in tropical climates, there is no question now as to the primary necessities of man as he lives in Western Europe: in order to provide for his child, he must procure food and shelter for the mother. Shelter means housing; food means proteids, carbohydrates, fats, water and salts. The building of a house involves labour; labour involves food-seeking by the labourer; food-seeking in solitude is profitless except where the earth produces adequate food. Where it does not, food-seeking involves the co-operation of other social units. The family of three that can live absolutely alone, unrelated to any other three-group, is rare in the modern world,—so rare that it cannot be regarded as the normal family. As a country fills up with men, the conditions demand greater and greater struggle; food-seeking is more difficult, yet more imperative; labour is less remunerative, yet more essential to success. Gradually, the solitary family must starve or leave the home in order to seek another family that both may survive. The aggregation of families we can see going on to-day as simply and as inevitably as we see it in imagination among primitive men. And if a single child of one father and mother means this necessary fight to wrest food and warmth from nature, a second and third and fourth child only intensify the necessity for struggle. Hence we have the farm, with its labourers; the hamlet, where they dwell and arrange for food; the village, where they develop industries in co-operation; the small

town, where farmer, hamleteer, villager and townsfolk meet at market; the large town, towards which all the others contribute their stream of goods in exchange for the specialised goods of a still greater world; the great cities, which are the thoroughfares of continental civilisations. What may have been the sequence of the past in this locality or that, among this race or that, I am unable to say, because I have not studied the problem; but as one passes through the thinly-populated lands, or the hamlets, or the villages, or the small towns of Scotland, one sees endless indications of how every institution named has its roots in the primary need for food and warmth, or may we say of warmth alone, the primary condition that enables the child to convert food material into growing tissue.

III. The Structural Basis of the Family Sentiment.

But if we imagine history producing unending currents each having its origin in a new family of three, we are not long before we notice that, by the inter-relation of families, there comes a greater current absorbing the smaller currents. Some groups are more closely inter-related than others, until one sometimes finds, in isolated localities, a whole village of fathers, mothers, grandfathers, grandmothers, great grandfathers, great grandmothers, brothers, sisters, cousins, first cousins, second cousins, and so on in all the near and far blood relationships. When people are isolated, as in ocean rocks like St. Kilda, we may safely expect to find every inhabitant related by blood to every other. But these social islands are equally to be found in coast villages, or inland villages, so long as they are untouched by the great currents of trade. In the days before transit was easy, the most natural growth in Scotland, for example, was the clan (the English form of the Gaelic word for children), and, apart from the needs of defence, the clan meant essentially the individuals of nearest relationship. So long as transit was difficult, the territory of the clan was limited; the great family kept together; the minor families within it became more integrated in the little society, and the sense of obligation to one another and for one another was based in feelings that every necessity of every day tended to renew. There the memory of one another was renewed at sunrise every morning and passed into the dream-life every night; the meaning of father and mother and brother and sister and child and grandchild and grandfather and grandmother would assume in the feelings a full-bodied significance unknown to the casual and

discrete life of the ages of rapid transit. If you go to the Outer Hebrides, you will find just those conditions as fresh and vivid as they could have been in the early Aryan civilisation. You will find grown men with the emotional habits of children; old men and old women feeling towards them as to their first infant; grandfathers, grandmothers, grandsons and granddaughters living in an atmosphere of family sentiment that knows only spontaneous service, not parental responsibility; only the actions flowing from affection, not the duties required by law; only the delight of common sacrifice, not a grudging assent to the exactions of an alien organisation; only the desire to help where need is, not the fear that help will kill gratitude. And it is out of such an atmosphere of family sentiment that the sacred obligations arise,—the sentiment of responsibility for children, the sentiment of duty to parents, the sacredness of blood relationship, the unconditional obligation of the group to preserve the individual. And not until the family numbers out-grow the family sentiment, and the individuals begin to lose touch, do we find any question raised of the child's duty to the parents or the parents' responsibility for the child. Where the social affections predominate, where love is lord, the question of duty needs no answer, because it is never asked; the child without mother is not motherless, because the great family provides for it; father, mother and child alike are always at home, the mother with her father and mother, the father with his mother and father, the child coming and going and tended by all.

IV. *The Family Sentiment as affected by the City.*

But the day comes when the clan ceases to be adequate; for one reason or another, superficially named political, or industrial, or geographical, but fundamentally named the struggle for life, the day comes when the clan necessarily passes away. The individuals scatter up into new attachments. New aggregations form. Among others there comes the city, the modern city, which in the majority of cases grows out of the mass-organisation of modern manufacturing industry. Here comes a social growth almost morbid in the severity of its pressure on individuals. The great families cease to be possible. They break up into their minimal units and once more it is father, mother and child. But now, under the extreme pressure of hunger, they have separated from their closest blood relatives and must accept as their friends other detached units like themselves. But between these isolated units there cannot be

the same intensity of family sentiment. The groups of three must do their best to keep that alive by the love of the one father for the one mother, the love of the two parents for the one child, neither sentiment having the support of the elders of the family group. Naturally, the family sentiment tends to atrophy. As naturally, the efficiency of the family tends to atrophy. What the great family group was able to do in the provision of food, of home, of education, of social service generally, the elemental families of three cannot achieve in the same fashion. And the child of each family must suffer, or a new method of service must be discovered.

But no two strata of society in a city are at the same stage of development. To the industrial family now reduced once more, under pressure of the mass-organisation, to the father, mother and child living in a room, there comes a voice from another stratum where the family sentiment has been kept alive by study and intercourse and an easier struggle for food. In this stratum, lives are longer, labour is easier, culture is higher, and the tradition of the family sentiment has all these to support it. The social worker whose duty it is to preserve the tradition of the elders does not cease to insist on the tradition even where the family has fallen to its minimal unity of three. He places on the physiological father and mother the same obligation for the child as, in the larger social group, he would have placed on the group as a whole. Not noting that the father and mother must work for many hours a day, unrelieved by any other member of the family, he yet demands of the over-burdened father all that only a man of leisure can provide, and of the over-driven mother all that only a woman of leisure can give. And he names the duty of the father and mother parental (not family) responsibility, attaching to it the full wealth of sentiment, the full emotion of obligation that he could legitimately have exacted only from the larger family group. Forgetting that he finds the family in conditions where the primary parental duties are impossible, he yet requires of the parents the impossible duties.

Naturally, the family fails. It can survive only by sacrificing the individual. Let us see how, in the struggle for existence, it creates a new mechanism for its own salvation. This new mechanism is the city.

V. Industrial aggregation of Families compels organisation of City.

Aggregation compels organisation, if the aggregating units

are to survive. A mob of families, as in an ill-organised camp, means so high a death-rate that nearly all the children die. A better organised mob means a decreasing death-rate, a greater capacity for survival of the group, of the family. From the unorganised mob, moved by impulse, to the organised city, moved by law, the process is perfectly continuous. Land is limited. Houses are necessary. There must be streets to move by, space to give air and light, water to make cleaning and cleanliness possible, drains to remove soil, artificial light to reduce the dangers of darkness, and the thousand other mechanisms organic to the city. You can see that everywhere the ultimate object is to preserve the family. The city is the protecting cradle for the new-born child.

VI. *The City as a Protective Social Growth for the Preservation of the Family.*

For the geographically isolated family, the farthest horizon is as far off as a man can go for his day's work and come again. When the horizon expands, families disintegrate for a time, but they create new organs to preserve themselves from extinction. The family is always the growing point of society. The derivative products are often mistaken themselves for independent growths and, when they are attacked, the unthinking person imagines that the whole fabric of society is falling to pieces. He fails to note that systems, institutions, special forms of social activity are but the deposits from an ever-flowing stream. Towns disappear and are built again. Countries are depopulated and filled again. Customs change, laws fall into disuse, but new customs come and new laws are made. It is the same irresistible instinct, the same desire, that creates every new society and will continue to create, to transform and re-create without end.

When, therefore, we talk of the decay of responsibility, we must speak subject to our knowledge of this invincible process of re-growth. The most stable society is a perpetual flux of men and institutions. History is a history of transits. We must, therefore, be prepared for endless transformations of things apparently most fixed; we must detach ourselves from the necessities of the moment if we would see how the affairs of the moment have come to be and if we would foresee what they will become.

Why has the relation of the city to the family been recently so much discussed? To answer this question fully would be to write the history of England since the Boer War began. Of the

many results of the War, one has been the awakening of the people to the need for physical self-examination. For nearly twenty years, I might even say eighty years, the great public health movement has been preparing the public mind for an era of personal hygiene. When the War came, it revealed to millions what only few had suspected—that among the individuals of our race the standard of fitness is, if not too low for national safety, at least lower than it ought to be. The nation was staggered to find so many thousands of recruits rejected as unfit for the healthy, open-air life of the army. A whole train of problems flowed from this fact. It was discovered—what ought to have been common knowledge for fifty years—that the infantile mortality was preposterously high, that the homes were unclean, food unsuitable, preventable diseases largely unchecked; that children at school suffered from defects of senses, chronic diseases, acute diseases, all acting as obstructions to the compelled work of education; that physical deterioration, if not true degeneration, was everywhere so common as to justify more radical investigation; that even the essential fitness of the family as an institution was seriously impugned by large numbers of people. The conviction stole into men's minds that, if society is to be regenerated, the regeneration must begin with the infant. Hence our army of health visitors, the epidemic of milk depôts, the effervescence of charity organisation societies, and the hundred other embodiments of irrepressible social enthusiasm. Mothers are found ignorant of the elementary laws of infant rearing. Fathers are found careless of the primary rituals of nature. Fathers and mothers are found unfit to educate their children, or are found disinclined to concern themselves with the things of the mind. The children, it is found, are ill-nourished. They have too little sleep, too little air, too little house-room, too little clothing, too little attention from parent or friend. The cry at once arises,—Let us feed them. The House of Commons, in a generous fit, echoes, Feed them, and the House of Lords repeats the echo. Hence it is that the English Statutes to-day contain the possibility of a public table everywhere for the school-child and the parent is requested to pay where he can, and, if he cannot pay directly, he will be permitted to pay as a ratepayer.

Curiously, this issue has come as an immediate solution of a supremely difficult question. I am not here concerned with the adequacy of the solution, though grave doubts are justified: nor with the nature of the solution, which seems to have sprung up from nowhere and gripped men's minds with a firm conviction.

I look at the matter merely as an accomplished social fact, just like the other manifestations of the family energy in the social growths flowing from it.

Two lines of thought have converged to produce this curious social result. One set of men keep insisting on the necessity for compelling the parent to attend to his child, to wash him, to feed him, to clothe him. They are, without doubt, asserting a great and primary duty. Another set of people keep insisting that the parent, if he is compelled by the State to perform certain duties, has equally the right to the service that will make his performance of these duties possible—public health service, education service, civic service generally. Here, too, we must admit, there is a certain truth. But while the Parentalists insist on the one aspect too abstractly, the Civicists insist too abstractly on the other. Both sides are committing an equal fallacy. They occupy different standpoints; but they both seem to speak from the same plane. For as the Parentalist insists on one truth—the duty of the parent, he forgets the other truth—the right of a parent; the Civicist equally insists on the one truth—the right of the parent, but forgets the other truth—the duty of the parent. But, in both cases, the parent is the centre of the contest. It is as a father that he claims a right; it is as a father that he has a duty imposed upon him. If, in the conditions of his life, he cannot rear his child as perfectly as a man should, he not unnaturally looks for the instruments that he shall use to help him and he not unnaturally forgets that it is on himself the duty lies to discover these instruments and to use them; it does not lie with the great mythical organisation that to him is the State. If, on the other hand, the Parentalist critic, knowing how much can be done by individual steadiness of character, insists that the father shall do more than he actually does, he not unnaturally presses too far the one aspect of responsibility and unintentionally exacts of the father what no single father can perform. The father and the critic fail to understand each other; they seem to be to each other unpardoning enemies, and hence our English feeding law (not yet our Scottish) has emerged out of a political contest where each side calls the other by foolish names and neither seems to see the end of the movement nor the principle of their own creed.

But if we go back to the primary nature of the family, if we satisfy ourselves that the city in all its specialisation, in all its organs, is after all but the body of which the family instinct is the soul, the enlarged organisation of which the family is the

embryo, we shall find that the father and his critic can easily be reconciled. The father, in going to the public school to find education for his son, is not going to an alien association where he has no right; he is rather going to the office he himself has created, the organ of culture originating at the home but outgrowing the home in largeness of effect and in efficiency. Or when, himself taken by fever or finding that his child through some mischance takes fever, he goes to the public health authority with the intimation, he goes not to an alien authority needing some other impulse to set it in motion; he goes rather to the institution he himself has created just for this contingency and, handing over his child for the time, he has him taken into safe keeping for the necessary season. Neither in education nor in disease can the father do for his child all that a good father wants always to do for his child. A child needs a nurse; but not every father can provide one. The child needs a school-master; but with every will to teach, every father cannot succeed in teaching. Whether it be want of time, or want of energy, or want of knowledge, it matters not: the result is one and the same—the child loses in the race. To keep his child free from disease; to fit his child by education for the work of the complex society he is to live in,—these are two primary duties of the father and, except in the poorest, most insufficient way, he cannot of himself either mentally or physically perform either the one or the other. He is driven by every social force, by every social ambition, by every good impulse, to seek for a means to keep his child alive and to inform his child's mind. To require, without conditions, that every father individually shall provide hospital and school for his child is to throw our society back, to give up an immense privilege without providing any compensation. Any social theory cannot, if it insists on such impossibilities as these, be regarded as of any consequence. It does not do to assume that any single factor in the situation is fixed. The father must go forward or he must go backward; the child must grow or he must starve; disease goes on to a bad issue or to a good issue as it is ill-treated or well-treated; the mind goes on to efficiency or inefficiency as it is well-educated or ill-educated. These are not speculations; these are facts. And I choose the hospital and the school as two typical parental necessities, which the parent practically never can himself provide adequately, and, even when he is a well-paid artizan, he cannot provide them at all. Here he is driven remorselessly to seek the co-operation of the great organisations. The very condi-

tions of his life, whether in a city or in the country, make any other course impossible. If we are to revert to the simple life of the clan, the reversal cannot take place unless we blot out whole stretches of our civilisation and even then the same problems will assert themselves for solution once more. Every age has its own special impossibilities. In our age, two impossibilities for the individual parent are the efficient hospital and the efficient school. Even the areas of individual towns and parishes are often found too small for efficient service of hospitals.

But what he cannot directly and individually provide, the parent provides indirectly through the city. What, however, he must learn to realise is that, whether produced by himself directly or by himself indirectly, the school and the hospital are equally his own; it is equally his duty to use them. By no other course can the physiological father and mother preserve the child from death or inefficiency. To survive functionally at all, the minimal group of three must use not merely the lesser, but also the greater, specialised family out-growths, which, in their aggregate, form the city.

VII. *The Family Sentiment and the Civic Sentiment.*

The organisation of the city does not proceed in a straight line nor does it strike its roots everywhere at once. As Professor Patrick Geddes has shown us in his vivid way, the city has a prolonged growth embodying tens of thousands of various energies. And cities are not all of one cast. Rather they are aggregates of survivals from many civilisations. When, however, under the impulse of some powerful single motive the mass of a city's people are drawn into a certain unity of feeling and thought, we see what the potential organisation of the city is. We see how a people of approximately one stratum will organise more easily and more rapidly than the multi-stratified city so much better known to us. But, even in the "faults" of the multi-stratified city, we trace hints of organisation that leave us in no doubt of the city's origin or of the origin of the composite social group. But whether we contemplate the relatively simple city or the relatively complex city, we find equally that gaps are possible between a city organisation and the minimal family, not to speak of the enormous gaps between the city and the individual. By the illusion of projection, intensified a thousand-fold by the different histories of the various strata of families, the city organisation proceeds as if it were some great objective mechanism, not to be

controlled by any human power. It is too great a thing for the individual man to regard as his own or the expression of himself. To be "a citizen of no mean city" is so high an ethical achievement that only the valiant patriot ever attains to it. And even he attains to it rather in feeling than in intellect. The revolution unmade a king, and made a consul; but he in turn, drawing his power primarily from the people, became the great projection of the people's mind and dominated for a generation his own creators. What we see so strikingly in Napoleon, we see also, but less strikingly, in every city. It is the same unconscious projection of collective power turning to dominate our feelings and imaginations. None the less is it true that the organisation created by multitudes of men, out of millions of individual impulses and ideas, is capable of becoming the imaginative expression of every one man's mind, the instrument of every one man's will. One great problem in our civic education is to teach the individual how to bridge the gap between himself and the city organisation,—between himself, the abstract individual, and himself again, the organised city.

Put in this vaguely abstract way, the educational problem looks fanciful. But take a case. Look to the actual father and mother of a child suddenly smitten with an infectious disease. In a moment, they think of the doctor; then they take his advice. The doctor notifies the case to the municipality, whose officers, in a few minutes, are in attendance. Observations are made; records are taken; a nurse and an ambulance appear and in half an hour the child, under the care of two trained women and a surgeon, lies carefully watched in a dainty cot. Perhaps, within the hour, an operation to save his life has been completed and the immediate urgency is over.

Trace now the sequence of actions. The father and mother, vaguely educated, do not live in the categories of municipal theory; but they know that they can rely on the municipal service and they know what step to take to set the service in motion. They are thus, in a moment of stress, unconsciously united in feeling to the great organisation that makes the salvation of their infant's life possible. When, however, the child passes from the home to the hospital, there at once emerges a feeling of antagonism between the parents and the municipality. They are jealous of its actions; they suspect its motives; they find their child of immeasurably greater value than they had formerly known; they long for its preservation, for its restoration, for its reappearance in the home.

On the other side, the municipal officers, forgetting, for the moment, the existence of the parents, lose themselves in devotion to the child. They bring all the science and skill and tenderness they can to bear on its salvation. They resent the intrusion of the parents; they take official possession of the child as if it belonged primarily to the city; they guard it jealously that no foolish mother shall spoil the treatment by over-indulgence and no foolish father gratify his fatherly sentiment at the expense of the infant's recovery. The parents have invoked a spirit that they cannot control. They have committed their child to it before they know how or when they shall receive their own again. In faith, they make the sacrifice; in faith, they await the result. When at last the infant, restored and healthy, goes home, the municipal officers place him among their statistics and the parents take him to their bosoms. The officers turn to others in more urgent need, carrying to them once more healing and service. The parents, absorbed once more in the lesser family sentiment, forget the city and all the prayers they raised to it in their need.

I have seen so often this sudden light of civic faith and this sudden darkness of civic infidelity, that I cannot but regard them as normal to the great mass of our incipient citizens. Hardly once in a long official experience have I found, among thousands, a parent that sustained, after the recovery and redelivery of his child, a shade of the same intensity of feeling as he showed on the first consciousness of danger. Now and again, out of conventional courtesy, a man has sent gifts to the hospital or to the nurse, associating everything with a person, nothing with the organisation that made the person functionally possible. Once or twice, I have seen a flow of grateful feeling that spread itself over an hospital staff, producing gifts for everybody and kind words that made duty a pleasure. But never have I seen any parent that frankly attributed to himself and his fellow-citizens the virtues that produce the city as an instrument for increasing the power of the family.

It is clear, therefore, that the gap in the mind is both intellectual and ethical. The ordinary man stops at the immediate person; he acts for the immediate person; he is grateful to individual persons; he turns from them to his own the moment the danger is over. On the other hand, the officers of a municipality tend to become official; more and more they imagine themselves individuals when their functional existence rests on a universal; more and more they act as if they held individual power when yet every

activity is conditioned by the system they serve under. It should be possible to bridge the distance between these two extremes,—to carry the father's impulse into a further development; to make the official realise that, through him, father and city are united in the child.

But the organisation of the city on the large scale risks the loss of the family sentiment by reducing the family to its minimum. As we have shown, the family sentiment has difficulty in surviving where only a father and mother and child are found together. The capacity for inter-suggestion is too limited. There is a want of atmosphere. At the same time, the very want of atmosphere generates the impulse to seek outside assistance in its readiest form and this is usually the civic doctor. On the other hand, the family sentiment where the family is large enough to sustain it effectively, asserts its ancient belief in the family capacity to serve all needs and tends to block the way to civic action. Over and over again have I met with obstruction to civic activity when the family sentiment was strong. This is probably the meaning of the long-continued refusal of the well-off classes to enter public hospitals. But everywhere this feeling is giving place to the readier acceptance of civic assistance. And as the readiness of acceptance has been hastened in the industrial areas by the mechanical reduction of the family capacity as the result of labour, so, in the wealthier orders, the family sentiment tends to evaporate with the increase of centrifugal tendencies in the individuals,—ease of transit, separate living, boarding schools and the other mechanisms of functional disintegration. Intellectually, it is commonly accepted that, in a thousand ways, the family home cannot compete with the civic hospital or school; but in feeling, this position is not always accepted quite frankly. There is a remnant of conviction that civic assistance is a last resort and a proof of family failure. Yet even this is passing away and we find in some cities that every class of the community, rich and poor, not merely admit the usefulness of their public institutions, but imperiously demand their use. In Glasgow, for example, it is now not uncommon for the Medical Officer of Health to remove to hospital from 90 to 100 per cent. of persons suffering from certain infectious diseases. This is done without compulsion. It is merely the municipal organisation acting in response to the wish of individual citizens. Infectious disease has always been a great educator and has taught civilisation many intimate truths. It continues to teach us, acting at once as a mechanically integrating

force, and as a revealer of civic duty. More pointedly than any other normally present fact it shows how essential the city is to the realisation and to the safety of the individual. It indicates also how we should bridge the abyss of feeling that lies between family and city.

Many forms of civic administration are the subject of legitimate dispute; but the public health functions of the city everyone, at least in Scotland, now accepts in theory, if not in practice. Hence it is from public health that I have taken a typical illustration. Probably the rooted fear of personal danger has predisposed every community to accept the protection and restrictions of the public health administration; but what began under stress of fear has persisted and developed because of convenience. Fear made the path; cool convenience crowds it. More than once I have known a village thrown into panic by a single infectious case. To-day the same village is to a man ready to hand over a case to the hospital authorities. In the outlying places, terror still destroys the family bond and kills the impulse of neighbourliness; but the public health movement is none the less one of the most striking examples of growth in citizenship.

The accident that the fear of infection is a primary motive in winning men's minds to the movement, need not obscure the movement's inner nature. Were such a fear its only motive, the movement would die locally whenever the panic passes. And in the earlier days of local organisation, this was what occurred. In a minor degree, it still occurs. But the movement has much deeper roots than this apparent fear. The fear only revealed the inadequacy of the home to carry through the salvation of the child. Under stress of fear, the parent creates or discovers a new mechanism and thereafter he is ready always to use it. The home is saved from an impossible duty and the death-rate goes down.

The education movement has, superficially, a very different history; but fundamentally education and the public health movement both arise from the inadequacy of the home.

And so we might draw illustrations from all the great organisations that constitute a municipality. Each organisation could be traced back to some family need that could not be adequately provided for in any other way.

VIII. *Causes of the diremption of Family and City.*

The reasons why the family and the city have fallen apart have been vaguely indicated already. The stages may be briefly

stated as follows :—First, there is the mass-organisation necessary for industrial evolution ; second, there is the consequent disintegration of the family group into minimal families of three, with all the necessary limitations ; third, there arises the necessity for representative administration, since, at an early stage of aggregation, the families become too numerous to act as a single council ; fourth, there is the projection of the representative organisation as if it were an alien power. The representative organisation and its officers become a force controlling the very people that elect them. The electors always find it impossible to maintain in complete activity the belief that the men elected derive their power from the electors and from no other source ; that, in fact, the representative bodies are simply the electors themselves acting in one capacity for a given purpose,—the concrete projection of the electoral mind. But, like all mental projections, sane or insane, the representative projection tends to become a fearsome and hostile obsession, a thing to be criticised, denounced and destroyed. Rarely, if ever, is it recognised as the product of the electoral mind itself. But since the city is worked just by this projected representative body, the elector, in his capacity as head of a family, almost necessarily considers the family and the representative bodies as antagonists to one another. Hence the primary difficulty in civic education is to restore to the citizen the lost sense of identity between the family and the representative body. He sees both family and city in abstraction from one another and accordingly he sees them entirely wrong.

IX. Parental Responsibility as affected by the City.

The common conception of responsibility assumes that the child belongs to his father much as his house and furniture belong to him. The common conception, no doubt, is vague and we need not press it too much ; but the common action and the common insistence on the duties of parents seem to presuppose that, if the child, all through his life, could be left entirely to the parents to bring up, to educate and to place on the world, the result would be the best possible whatever the parent's capacity for this gigantic task may be. This is another way of saying that the whole course of city growth, the whole results of aggregation, are simply an unavoidable social disaster ; not a beneficent opportunity for expansive organisation. But, right or wrong, the city is a social fact and we must take it as it is. We are not

here estimating political results or prospects; we are simply attempting to trace a principle among actual conditions.

But it is surely wholly erroneous to maintain that the child should be the exclusive care of the parents. To begin with, this is hopelessly impossible. At the best, the parents are simply social trustees for the child. They have no final authority to do with him as they choose. They must honour all the obligations they undertake in becoming parents. Among the first of their obligations, they have to learn that the child belongs not exclusively to them, but, through them, to the society they live in. Sooner or later, every parent learns this lesson; because the child grows to manhood or womanhood. Yet the lesson comes to every parent as a surprise and a revelation when the personality of the child first asserts itself. "Woman, wist ye not that I must be about my Father's business?" This is what every parent must face. But if he is educated, he foresees it and works towards it. He knows that this assertion of independent personality is at once the sign of manhood and the proclamation that the child, from the beginning, is not simply the son of his individual father, but also the son of Man.

But if the child is not simply and exclusively the property of the individual father, the father must be, from the beginning, under obligation to recognise this aspect of the child's life and to develop it. This, however, he cannot at any time do if he confines the child's environment to the immediate home and family of three. He must, from the beginning, take hold of all the instruments of culture, all the institutions of civilisation, all the organisations that tradition has specialised for the total culture of his child. His responsibility, therefore, is fully discharged to his child only when he does for it all that he individually can, first, immediately by his own powers in his individual home and next by his mediate powers in the school, the hospital, the city as a whole, to secure the nurture and education of his child towards full citizenship.

Here I am not concerned with any practical consequences that flow from the theory. That would lead me into politics, with which a Sociological Society has nothing to do except after the fact. What I have sought here to indicate is that the actualities of our present practice demand something a little more subtle, a little more thorough-going, than the abstract parenthood and the abstract citizenship that have for so many years been filling us with weariness and confusion.

X. Illustration from Recent Edinburgh Investigation.

If it were necessary to give a reason for discussing the family, it would be difficult to find one better than the recent investigation in Edinburgh. The analysed facts are given in the Report by the Edinburgh Charity Organisation Society. So far as I am aware, the central idea of that investigation, which was first proposed and sketched by Mr. Arthur Sherwell, M.P., is new in British social work. Usually, such an investigation starts from the home and radiates to the public institutions. In the present case, the investigation started with the school and sought for the history of the school-child in his home. Every child of a given school was medically examined with the greatest minuteness possible in the circumstances. Equally, his home and the remainder of his family were investigated economically. The child, thus examined, was then fitted into the home system of ascertained facts, which were verified along all the available lines of investigation. Some 781 families, involving approximately 1,400 children of school age, were thus analysed in detail. The resulting wealth of facts is enormous, and will provide problems for many a year to come. In this paper I can deal only with the large generalities suggested by a pretty intimate knowledge of the concrete facts recorded. But I may detail two or three specific impressions that this investigation has made on some minds in the North.

First, there is the obvious fact that the family as we understand it does not carry through the work that we habitually assign to it. Read through the details of any of these family summaries and you will hardly find one where the physiological father and mother are equal to the load of duty placed upon them or, under legitimate impulse, undertaken by them. Even with perfect health, which is rare, with perfect character, which is rarer, and with perfect prudence, which is rarest, the men and women here involved almost all require the support of outside institutions and, when you consider the whole facts, you cannot say that any other course is possible. Let the conditions as they stand be right or let them be wrong; but as they stand, they make it impossible for two people, a father and a mother, to do by themselves more than a fractional share of what is due to the child. If you doubt this, scrutinise for yourselves the multitudinous details. Even when we eliminate drink, incapacity, debauchery, and all such vices of personal character, we are yet faced with the difficulty as to why a great city produces conditions that overwhelm the two most important individuals, the father and mother.

Second, it seems clear that if the family did not seek the assistance of external organisations, it would sink into a lower degree of efficiency than even these investigations reveal. If there were no school, the child would not only be grossly neglected in body, but he would also be robbed of every chance of intellectual or ethical culture. If there were no dispensaries, he would not only suffer from the minor dirt diseases that dispensaries do not tackle, but he would go under in his multitudes to the stress of serious disease. If there were no hospitals, he would not only in sickness have to rely on the overcrowded and fœtid room where he was born, but he would also have for nurse the overdriven and uneducated mother. And so we might take him through other relations. In every one of them, but for the outside organisation, he would live only for a little time or, if he lived longer, he would not achieve even the moderate success he now does.

Third, it is not want of intelligence, or want of character, that can account for the failure of the family to do its work. It is not possible here to argue the question fully, but my impression is that this analysis of concrete cases merely reveals the extreme of which every family is an instance. It is only another example to us of the fact that no family of three can live by its own resources; but the example is so striking because the conditions of life are so stringent. In seeking external support for their energies, those families are doing only what every other family in its degree does.

Fourth, we cannot, therefore, simply say that, if the sense of parental responsibility were once restored, those conditions of failure would disappear. The conditions of failure are not peculiar to the poor; they are true of every class. It is only that, among the poor, they become so obvious that none can doubt their existence and none ventures to deny the necessity for help.

Fifth, it may be that, on the extreme view, it were better that no external agency should offer any assistance to these failing families; but simply to say so is to beg the question. The broad fact is that of all these families scarcely one is self-sufficient. Let it be admitted that drink is a potent cause of failure, that thrift, as ordinarily understood, hardly exists, that a different early history might mean a different later history; but let us not suppose that, in offering these minor criticisms, we are altering the central fact, namely, that in this class of society, as in every other, the family cannot do for the child all that the child needs to fit it for citizenship.

XI. *Restoration of the Family Sentiment by the mediation of the City.*

The external alienation of the civic organisation from the family is largely an historical accident or rather an accident of irregular city growth. It is not a final obstacle to the restoration of the true civic feeling, which supervenes on the perception of the identity of city and family.

If we were to use Hegelian terms, we might say that, from the point of view of logic, the minimal family of three is mere Being or the immediate. It expresses itself, however, in the endless variety of appearance, or Existence, coming then under the categories of the ordinary life as it is lived in the city—houses, streets, tramways, shops, banks, stock exchanges, etc., etc. These all proceed as if they were themselves final embodiments of some idea; but they are, after all, if left to themselves, only a passing show. Slowly emerges the organisation of the city as a whole, creating its systems of officials with ever more and more differentiating duties. Then we see that what is here revealed is only what the family had within itself. And we attain to the *Notion* of the city, which is also the "truth" of the family. Perhaps this looks a little fantastic to the present positive-minded generation of science; but it is on the whole as good a way as any other of expressing the essentially organic nature of city and family. What appears merely mechanical, the result of several methods of voting or transit or finance, is fundamentally after all but the external form that some definite mental purpose has taken. The form is only the index of continual synthetic growth. Every new function that the city develops and, on trial, sustains, is but the sign of newly elaborated structures. And as the individuals whose massed activities have generated the great city all pass away, we are continually obsessed with the illusion that the city has come from some other than a personal source.

Is there anything in the functions of the city to check this obsession? I think there is. If only we had time habitually to reflect, we should find on every hand some reminder of the city's origin, some invitation to believe that its growth is one with our own, some stimulus to feel that the city offers a scheme for the highest realisation of the individual's activities. We could give many pointed illustrations. But perhaps those already given, the hospital and the school, are as striking as any. If you total up the functions of a great municipality like Glasgow, you will be amazed to find how many pages the mere enumeration will fill.

And in a nation of cities like London, the civic unit—the family—would be hopelessly lost were it not that at every hand it is reasserted in the functions of the city.

More now than at any other period is it our duty to study the functions of the city in relation to the family. More now than at any other time in this country is the conception of the state as an external alien force passing into the conception of the state as the form of the expression of the general will. The abstract State—the mysterious well-spring, whence all power flows—is slowly expanding into the concrete State—the focus of innumerable centres whence alone it derives its energy. In other words, Central Government and Local Government have in recent years grown up as a differentiating unity, until we hear men speak indifferently of State-feeding when they mean feeding by the parish or the municipality, and of State-maintenance when they mean that the municipality provides work for the unemployed.

In this turmoil of rapidly shifting concepts, it is natural that ancient landmarks should disappear; but it is the landmarks that disappear, not the land. The reality of the family is only becoming a hundred-fold more real as the functions of the family are more and more developed and specialised. For the moment, if the duty of the parent is confused, the duty preparing for him is greater and more exacting. Beyond the narrow horizon of his family of three, he sees, too, a horizon that fades for ever and for ever when he moves. But in the growing organisation, he is ever finding new revelations of what the potentialities are, new ways of increasing his own and their efficiency, new stimuli to active citizenship, new invitations to greater personal effort. All this, it is true, we find only now and then, in moments of social enthusiasm, at local elections, or when some great war excites the people; but none the less it is a reality and has in it the promise of great developments. The hopes and the fears that, in a system of city development, the family will be absorbed and superseded by some monstrous growth that destroys personality, sterilises ambition, and leaves every personal duty to someone else, are ungrounded in fact and incoherent in theory. Things do not happen in that way. It is only that the speculators in woods are lost for the trees. If we but analyse what is happening before our eyes, what is happening within our minds, what is happening in the streets outside, we shall not be long before we grasp the true significance of the city, which is the family grown, and of the family, which is the city growing. To restore the ethical unity of the two is the task of civic education.

W. LESLIE MACKENZIE.

LORD ACTON ON THE HISTORY OF FREEDOM.

The two volumes of essays which have been published under this title serve again to remind us of the great loss which historical science has suffered by Lord Acton's death. These essays illustrate again, and in relation to many new subjects, the breadth of his knowledge and the keen analytical power of his mind. Lord Acton moves with almost equal ease and with just the same kind of critical discrimination in the region of contemporary political events as in those of former times; one or two of these essays, such as those on the Vatican Council, the Mexican Empire, and the Franco-Prussian War, are indeed extremely interesting examples of the treatment of contemporary politics in the manner, and with the analytical power, of the historical scholar. It is hardly necessary to say that these essays exhibit once again that astounding wealth of detailed knowledge which is the admiration and the despair of the humble historical student; there is, indeed, no modern historian who, on the centuries which succeed the mediæval period, has such an intimate knowledge of detail; there is no one whose acquaintance with the incidental literature of history can be put beside his. It is, however, perhaps to be regretted that the editors should have decided to republish all the essays contained in these two volumes, for, though all are learned, not all represent the maturity of Lord Acton's knowledge or critical judgment, and some of them hardly do full justice to his memory.

In this Review we are however not concerned so much with the historical essays in these volumes, as with those which deal with the history of liberty; the editors have rightly, indeed, recognised that many of the essays, while not directly bearing upon the subject, are yet clearly related to it, serve to elucidate or illustrate aspects of the opinions which are set out in the first two essays. And indeed they do this in a very notable fashion—essays such as those on the American Constitution and Civil War, or on the Inquisition serve to bring out very clearly what it was that Lord Acton understood by liberty.

It has been understood that Lord Acton had always contemplated a great work which should serve as a complete guide to the history of freedom; it is very lamentable that he was never able to begin this, and that we have nothing but these few lectures and essays to indicate the general nature of his scheme.

These lectures do, however, present us with a view of the subject which, incomplete as it is, serves to give us some idea of the broad lines upon which his theory of liberty and of the history of the progress of liberty were conceived, and they also indicate very closely his conception of the dangers which threatened the further progress and development of freedom.

Certainly no historian ever set before himself a greater task, or one more worthy of the most strenuous labour. Here, indeed, we have something of the true philosophy of history, the attempt to get behind the mere record of change, to ask whether there are principles which lie behind the constant ebb and flow of historical conditions and relations.

It was indeed necessary that scientific history should shake itself clear of the abstract speculations of some eighteenth and early nineteenth century philosophic historians, or historical philosophers, it was necessary that men should approach the study of human actions and of human institutions without assuming some vast system, into which it was already predetermined that all things must fit. To approach history with a determined and preconceived theory before there was any mass of strictly verified data upon which to work, was indeed to render all progress impossible. It was, therefore, necessary that the founders of modern scientific history, like Ranke in Germany and Stubbs in England, should resolutely refuse to pay any attention to the abstract systems, the abstract speculations, in history. And the incredibly rapid progress of scientific method and actual historic knowledge has more than justified the attitude of these founders of the method. To substitute a reasoned and careful consideration of the political, religious, and social forces out of which the new order of Europe has arisen for vague declamations and ignorant dogmatism, such was the work of Ranke; and to carry out an enquiry into the changes in English institutions, to show how these gradually grew from the simpler to the more complex forms, that has been the greatest achievement of the school of Constitutional historians, of whom, in England, Stubbs has been the leader.

We have now transcended the sceptical attitude in history, or, rather, we can leave that to the intelligent amateur. What we know, we know, and how little it is that we know, we also know, but we have found the clue to the treatment of political and constitutional development, and it is only the amateur or the ignoramus who doubts it. I could wish that I did not feel

some doubt whether some of our historical scholars are not for the moment, it can only be for the moment, tending to fall back into that bog from which Ranke and Stubbs delivered us, into that morass of the method of mere enumeration of historical events. But this relapse can only be momentary, and serious historical scholarship has established itself permanently.

But now that we have so far reached our goal, that we have discovered our method, and that we view historic facts no longer as merely detached points, but as organically related to each other, now, I should venture to say, it is time that we should begin to think of the larger meaning of history, to see that behind the organic growth of constitutions behind the forces which at any given moment determine the nature of political relations, there lie greater principles still. The history of human society, as we read it, is not the history of an endless struggle of competing forces, but rather seems to present to us a slow movement towards the realization of some principles in which human nature finds its true development and expression.

It is very probable that for some time to come many historical scholars will be suspicious of this, will suspect that this is only the old philosophy of history, the old enemy come to life again. We must be prepared for this; every science has its own proper intellectual disease, and the disease of a merely archæological temper always threatens the historical student. And indeed we suffered much and greatly at the hands of the philosophical historian. But the world has changed, there is really no need to be afraid, the most timid historical scholar may lift his head up a little from his spade work, and will return to his labour all the better for having for a moment caught sight of the general plan of the ground on which he is working. And at least the technical scholar may be reassured when he sees that a man whose technical knowledge was superior to that of almost every one, is just the man who had conceived of history in the largest spirit and had set before himself the largest subject.

Lord Acton means by liberty much more than a share in the control of government; in one passage he defines it in the following terms:—

“By liberty I mean the assurance that every man shall be protected in doing what he believes his duty against the influence of authorities and majorities, custom and opinion.”

The definition is, of course, too limited, and indeed it would seem to illustrate a somewhat defective training in the stricter

methods of political philosophy. Lord Acton is evidently thinking of liberty almost entirely under the terms of freedom in moral and religious thought and action. His judgment would have been more complete and adequate had he learned to think of liberty in larger terms, in the terms of the full development of all the capacities and qualities of human nature; but while Lord Acton's phrase is somewhat narrow his meaning is sane and just, for his concern for religious and moral freedom is really a concern for that which seemed to him to be the highest form of self-expression. And even those who may have no special interest in the theological side of Lord Acton's definition, will easily recognise behind these phrases the conviction that the supreme purpose of social organization is to establish such a system of order as will enable a man to will and to live freely.

If Lord Acton's meaning is on this side just, it is also important to observe that he has seized the truth that in order to attain this moral and spiritual freedom man needs the protection of the social order, that though the true freedom is that of the soul, it cannot be attained and preserved except through the external organization of society. It may, perhaps, be doubted whether Lord Acton had attained to a completely organic conception of the relation between the individual and society; he is perhaps thinking mainly of the protection which society can give to the individual, and does not very clearly recognise the organic interrelation of the individual and the common life; while he recognises the need of protection he is perhaps hardly aware of the larger truth that in all the highest aspects of life as well as in the lower, man lives and acts through mutual support and co-operation between himself and his fellows. Perhaps it is the want of some clear conception of all this which renders his treatment of the history of freedom a little incoherent, so that while he treats of the progress of the recognition of the internal liberty of the soul alongside of the progress in political freedom, he does not quite succeed in reducing the history of the two aspects of freedom to a strict unity. But at least Lord Acton is wholly free from that confusion of mind which sets the progress of the freedom of the individual life in opposition to the progress of the organization of society.

The subject which Lord Acton had set before himself is really nothing else than the main subject of all sociological enquiry, the history of the development of the customs and institutions under which man strives to realise his complete personal individuality. For the progress of man is towards the

completion of his own individuality, but this is conditioned by the fact that man is dependent for the possibility of progress on the society of his fellowman, and in order that this society may produce its proper results it must develop customs and institutions which are maintained and modified by its coercive authority.

The history of the progress of human society is therefore the history of the attempt, unconscious or deliberate, to find those institutions which at any given moment represent the highest attainable freedom for the individual, the attempt to provide through the organization of society the adequate basis for the most effective action of the individual.

Such is the subject which Lord Acton set before himself, and it was natural that he should deal with the subject primarily from the point of view of the freedom of religion. For to one who like Lord Acton finds in religion the highest term of a man's individuality and self-expression, anything which has the nature of restraint or coercion in the religious sphere must be specially abhorrent. It was, therefore, natural that, as against the somewhat vacillating judgment of many eminent historians, whose scientific method was not adequately reinforced by a firm grip upon first principles, he should very dogmatically maintain that religious persecution was the deepest crime against humanity and the greatest obstacle to progress. With characteristic freedom from merely traditional prejudice he denounces religious intolerance whether it was exhibited in the principles and practise of the mediæval church, or the reformed churches.

When now we examine Lord Acton's sketch of the progress of freedom we are compelled to recognise that his knowledge and comprehension are not always equally complete. His knowledge of the last four centuries is encyclopædic, and his judgment, if we except his attitude to the French Revolution, is not open to serious criticism, but his summary view of ancient history and thought is neither adequate nor convincing, and his treatment of mediæval history and thought is at best inadequate.

Lord Acton rightly lays great stress on the importance of the doctrine of the law of nature in the Stoics and Cicero and the great jurists of the Digest; he rightly recognises that this doctrine is the form under which these thinkers apprehended the principle that the rights of human nature are not measured by civil laws, but have their foundation in conditions and possibilities which lie beyond the sphere of the sovereign power. But I venture to think that Lord Acton makes a profound mistake

when he thinks that this doctrine is not already the central point both of the Aristotelian and Platonic theory of society. Those who have asked themselves seriously what is meant by the Platonic discussions of the nature of justice, or who have understood the real significance of the Aristotelian test which is to distinguish the good from the bad constitution cannot fail to understand that not only Rousseau in the "General Will," but also the Stoics in the "Natural Law" are reproducing the great principles which were first set out by Plato and Aristotle. When, therefore, Lord Acton says:—"We are seeking out the influences which brought arbitrary government under control, either by the diffusion of power, or by the appeal to an authority which transcends all government, and among these influences the greatest philosophers of Greece have no claim to be reckoned"—it is evident that he had never clearly understood what were the main principles of the great Greek philosophers. It is no doubt true that the later philosophers of the ancient world represent a great advance on the earlier in their conception of personality, and a writer like Cicero represents a great progress in the apprehension of the organic relation of the freedom of the soul to self-government in the political sphere. But that is not the same thing as to say that Plato and Aristotle did not understand the difference between an arbitrary government which acts as it pleases, and a government which represents the supremacy of principles which lie behind political power, or that Aristotle did not understand the practical value of the organisation of government under such forms as would secure the "common control," while they also would tend to check the dangers of popular government.

It is the more strange that Lord Acton should have fallen into this mistake about the great Greek philosophers, for in his treatment of the development of the Athenian constitution he has urged that it is there that we came to that supremely critical moment at which men began to recognise the supremacy of law over arbitrary power, and that it is there also that we find the first beginnings of the progressive development of the machinery of self-government.

If Lord Acton fails to understand the debt which the theory of political freedom owes to the greatest of the ancient thinkers, he does ample justice to the contribution of the Stoics, and to the great jurists who embodied much of the principles of their political philosophy in the Roman jurisprudence. We cannot indeed overestimate the importance, in the history of civilisation,

of the fact that the jurists, following partly the Stoics, partly still older Greek definitions of the nature of law, set out so emphatically the principle that law is not any command of the sovereign but only such commands as are proper deductions from or applications of eternal and immutable principles to the circumstances of a particular time and place. These principles inherited by the civilians and canonists of the Middle Ages and developed by the political thinkers of those times did much to counteract the mischievous tendency to confuse power with authority.

Lord Acton's treatment of the influence of Christianity on the progress of freedom is in the main admirable. It is no doubt true and it is always worth while to restate it, that the separation of religious from secular authority was one of the main elements in the development of a complete conception of human liberty. This was not due so much to the fact that the struggle between the Church and the Temporal power during the middle ages contributed to the development of the constitutional liberties of Europe, but rather to the claim of the Christian conscience that in the highest form of life, that is, in the spiritual sphere, the state cannot legitimately claim any authority at all. This is indeed the reason why to the enquirer into the history of freedom the most memorable documents in the early history of the Church, are the tractate and the epistle of Pope Gelasius, in which he laid down the great principle that while the church and the State are both Divine institutions, neither of them has any authority within the sphere of the other. It is no doubt true that in the great struggle between the Empire and the Papacy it might seem as though men had forgotten this, but the principle survived the struggle and vindicated liberty of conscience at least against the State.

It is possible that Lord Acton overestimated the influence of the great struggle between the church and the secular power in furthering the progress of constitutional freedom. The forces which were making for this were in action before the struggle developed and apart altogether from this. The truth is that the constitutional movement of the Middle Ages represents the normal development of the principles and characteristics of the political organisation of the Teutonic societies, which we can trace clearly from the time when these societies began to assume a definite form. As early as the ninth century we can see that the constitutional movement was in full progress, and even that men were conscious

of this; and it is important to observe that the development of the movement was most rapid and complete in England where the opposition of church and State was least important.

It must also be remembered that the ancient jurisprudence had handed down to the mediæval world the principle that the people are the only ultimate source of political authority. This is the real explanation of the fact that Thomas Aquinas and Marsilius of Padua, the one representing the ecclesiastical tradition, the other the secular, agree in laying down the general principles of constitutional freedom.

The treatment of the development of personal and political freedom in modern times seems to me admirably handled, until Lord Acton comes to the French Revolution and the political theory of Rousseau, but there I must think that sometimes he has been unable to take into account the main features of history and of theory, and has been unduly influenced by certain aspects of the history, and by a mistaken reading of the theory. It is probably true that the French Revolution did not shake off completely the superstition of an absolute sovereign power in the State, and that consequently the constitutional governments of modern Europe have not fully learned the limits of political authority. But to say, as Lord Acton says in his lecture, "I would have wished to show you that the same deliberate rejection of the moral code which smoothed the paths of absolute monarchy and of oligarchy, signalled the advent of the democratic claim to unlimited power"—this is really paradox passing all reasonable limits, and has no claim to be taken as serious historical criticism. And Lord Acton's failure to understand that Rousseau in the "Contrat Social" laid the foundation of the very principle which he is himself striving to express, is almost incomprehensible. For Rousseau in the "Contrat Social" set out once again to lay down the greatest of all political principles, that the authority of the State rests upon a moral basis, and represents the necessary means by which men are to rise from the merely animal to the truly human life, and that the principle which binds men together in the society of the State must combine the highest freedom of the individual with the greatest efficiency of the whole society.

I have seemed to lay stress mainly upon the defects of the essays; and I think that it is necessary to point out their defects, for so great and so justly great is the reputation of Lord Acton as a historian and a moralist that it is to be expected and to be

hoped that these essays will be widely read, and that their influence will be long felt.

But when we have recognised these defects I should hope that the example of the essays, the breadth and dignity of their principles will command the attention of all historical students; and that the task which Lord Acton had set before him may some day be resumed and carried out to its conclusion.

A. J. CARLYLE.

PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN SOCIAL TRANSMISSION.

Social transmission as implied or expressed in the familiar term "education," is one of the many problems confronting the sociological investigator, which are materially affected by the results of recent Psychology. These results, as applied to education, have served to bring about a shifting of the centre of gravity, so that it no longer rests exclusively upon the material of education, but is increasingly dependent upon the nature of the child. This necessitates a new statement of the problem as affecting the general theory of society. Given the two kinds of transmission, the organic known as heredity, and the historical known as the social heritage, the problem is how at each stage they are related to each other. At the same time the new interest in this set of problems has been in late years of importance in determining the direction of psychological advance. If Society consists of individuals participating in various kinds of association, then it becomes important to know what effect these associations have upon the individual, and the reverse. If the study of the social order is pushed back to the region of social origins, psychological factors become significant as the roots from which social life has arisen. The comparative psychologist is now able to mark with some degree of certainty the stages in the development of mind among the lower animals, and, while the proverbial "missing link" is not available for experiment, still, by applying a sort of psychical homology, he is able to ascertain relatively what amount of advance was accomplished in the period of anthropogenesis. Again, the method of ethnology, which carries social phenomena back to a set of factors as relatively simple as possible, prepares the investigator to see to what a large extent social origins are dependent upon human nature.

The historical method has in our day completed a triumph that even surpasses that of astronomy and physics. It has been applied in every field of thought, from biology up, until now, our characteristic way of thinking things is in terms of how they have come to be. A social fact of baffling complexity, when the attempt is made to deal directly with it, becomes clarified when taken back along its evolutionary path to its simplest form, and the observer

is able to see under just what circumstances it has acquired accretions and complications. Most institutions and customs, the principles of law, morals and religion, even costume and manners, become explicable social facts when seen in historical perspective. Indeed, to have a history is in the opinion of some writers, like Vierkandt, the mark which differentiates 'culture-peoples' from 'nature-peoples'; and certainly, what we mean by 'culture' is the possession of a body of tradition, which passes in the manner of a stream from faint beginnings through generation after generation, sometimes widening, sometimes narrowing, until it reaches the present. In this stream, the historian and ethnologist are able to trace peculiarities and directions of current as if there were innumerable streams within the larger one. But it is possible that this method may be overdone. To establish a historical series is an important step toward understanding, but it may not unassisted be able to give the final word of explanation. The historian is liable to erect his series into a fetish and be led to neglect other factors that may be important. It becomes an easy habit to reduce all social processes into their historical determinations and believe that these can give a sufficient explanation. It should be remembered that the historical series is not a stream but a succession, and that this succession, whether operating to produce a sameness of result, or a variation, passes through succeeding generations of human beings and is in each case to some degree an output of human nature. This is by no means to argue that we have in human nature a constant, but merely that for the tradition to be alive at all, it must enter into this complex organisation of instincts, feelings, interests, and so on, which make up what we term human nature. To illustrate: literary criticism has in late years reached the extreme of the historical method; the Greek dramatists and philosophers are products of well-ascertained historical determinants which can be traced in the development of Greek civilisation. In like manner, the Elizabethans are the product of a particular conspiracy of historical factors. But alongside this is the fact that we to-day, many generations removed from Greek, or even Elizabethan conditions, have a certain amount of pleasure in reading Sophocles, or Shakespeare. In the case of any classic, historical determinants are important as far as they go, but some residue, it may be a small one, exists to give these works a perennial interest.

The fact that so many people of our day rest so complacently within the requirements of convention has perhaps led to a restricted

idea of the possibilities of human nature; but it should be remembered that modern life is so protected that occasions calling forth volcanic tendencies are few and far between. And again, the human nature of ordinary life gives small measure of its potentialities under other possible conditions. But every student of childhood and adolescence is aware that the individual has, or had, unnumbered possibilities which a careful process of selection has submerged, possibly for the whole life-time. Childhood and Youth may be compared with a plant-bed in the open, untouched by cultivation. Of this rank variety of vigorous growths a few are taken and transferred to the hot-house, where instead of unrestricted development, they undergo a continual pruning and training, until in the end our plant-bed has developed into a wall-tree. Biologists and historians alike are puzzled by the fact that the world's great men have come in groups; the biologist is unable to find an adequate time for producing the necessary degree of variation, and the historian, with all his search for historical causes can do little more than record the fact. Perhaps the psychologist of childhood and adolescence may be allowed to suggest that a few tendencies he knows to exist in every child may have taken advantage of the alteration in the choking-process to shoot up into fully formed plants. All of this is merely to emphasize the fact that civilization has by no means exhausted the possibilities of human nature, which may at any time under favourable conditions contribute to the historical succession, or even alter its course.

It being granted that social filiation is inclusive of both historical succession and psychological adjustment, we may, with some degree of profit, examine the details exhibited in the process of adaptation. Comparative psychologists have found it convenient to erect a scaffolding beside the mental tree, the stages of which mark roughly the periods in the development of the mind. These periods are called the instinctive, the intelligent, and the rational. Under the first are included all those mental functions that appear in a stereotyped, hereditarily determined series of reactions to situations met in the environment. By intelligence, the comparative psychologist means a certain plasticity as against the previously stereotyped quality of instincts, an ability to alter behaviour on the basis of individual experience. Practically all the lower animals may be included under these two terms of the scheme, although one is able to find in the more intelligent animals the first few stages of progress toward reason which Mr. Hobhouse covers by the term 'practical judgment.' We are safe in saying

that reason, as the use of fully-formed ideas capable of organisation outside the chain of habits, is the distinctively human possession. The scheme becomes available for our present purpose when we remember that development into a higher stage of mind by no means destroys, or even restricts, the functions of the previous period. Intelligence is only plastic instinct and the motivation of reason is interest ultimately rooted in instinct. Life-values, when read large, appear the same throughout the animal series including man; and the fundamental motive forces in human life are those it possesses in common with that of its animal forbears. The ancient expression that man has reason and no instincts is thus seen to be fallacious. The reason of the logics is a species of dessicated unreality; and to my thinking, the only part of logic worth the reading is that which deals with the sources of fallacy. Men are ruled primarily by inclination and prejudice and by reason in proportion as it gives support to these. With this presentation of the genetic scheme we are prepared to see some of the factors necessarily concerned in social transmission. There will be found in every human being the series of instinct emotions which, in their elaboration, mark out the interests of life. There will be found again a great body of intelligent acquisitions, making up what are commonly termed "habits." These acquisitions come as the result of practice and in dealing with actual things and situations. To what extent life consists in the exercise of these automatisms, the hypnotist and alienist are best aware. But some slight realisation of their importance may be obtained by recalling the statement of Professor James that without habit most of the day would be consumed in the simple and to most of us uninteresting process of making the toilette. Beyond this is what we call reason, for the majority little more than the ability to arrange the order in which automatisms will work themselves out. With the few, it is sufficient to control the course of life in accordance with ideas and ideals. Let us now, as best we can, translate this scheme into social terms. The sociology of mere historical succession is based upon the assumption that man is exclusively a rational creature who receives and transmits and lives in accordance with ideas of varying complexity and importance. But this ideal stream, while without doubt present, does not appear to possess the depth which has been ascribed to it. The bed of the stream seems to consist of a little-examined, but almost unlimited layer of products dependent for their existence upon functions of the mind below the rational and which roughly correspond to what

ethnologists call "folk-products." There has been in late years too distinct a tendency to relegate folk-life to the region of social origins, and think of it as merely the head waters of the historical stream, when, as a matter of fact, to change our form of figure, it is a series of springs re-enforcing and giving vitality at every step to the historical forces. The term "survival" is in some respects unfortunate, leading one to suppose that its presence in the civilized community is equivalent to the possession of useless or vestigial organs. Mr. Gomme, in his most illuminating treatise on folklore, regards this body of custom and story entirely as a series of survivals—the percolations of a buried culture stage through the layers that have been spread above it. We venture to suggest that so far from that being the case, the existence of this folk-product is a necessary condition for the civilisation by which it is supposed to have been submerged. To take so common-place a subject as marriage, its history is by this time very well known, its primitive origins, its stages in attaining to monogamy, its sacramental sanctions, and its acceptance by the highest civilisations as an ethical institution. All of the little eccentricities of ceremony are naturally regarded as survivals which its development has been unable completely to slough off. But we venture to suggest that all of these so-called survivals have a real and living existence in the psychonomy of the participants. That the daughter is somehow the property of her parent is no less the unconscious conviction of the modern father giving her away at the altar than of the primitive one who insists on seeing in her place an adequate number of cattle. The civilised lover, no less than the primitive one, has the impulse to capture and carry away his bride. And the ceremonies attached to this achievement of possession constitute a sort of vaccination treatment which makes the process possible without the exhibition of more disturbing primitive traits. Behind all these methods, as efficient now as at the origin of humanity, stands the primal instinct which makes this aspect of life possible at all.

To return to our genetic scheme, we are suggesting that just as a succession of ideas from the outside depends in the individual on a certain building up of the foundations, instinctive and intelligent, so this generalised to the group, shows the historical succession of ideas dependent upon a constant folk output in the form of custom and even superstition. It is doubtful if the highest religion could survive a generation whose childhood had not been fed on Santa Claus and fairy story and even magic. This is by no means affirming the correspondence of individual and race

supposed by the old culture-epoch theory, although in justice it must be said that the latter has in principle contributed much both to science and to the practical undertakings of education. It merely asserts the psychological fact that race and individual alike progress from bare instinct to reason and that it would be a mistake to suppose that in the individual this progress is unmediated. A kind of succession has been postulated by some modern thinkers, as Tarde and Baldwin, which is intended to exhibit the machinery of transmission, finding this to consist in the principle of imitation. But to my thinking, these writers err on the side of over-emphasis, leaving no room for the true historical continuity of ideas. Imitation does play its part in the higher stages of intelligent learning and transmission that we have attempted to delimit. But if a custom propagates itself by imitation, a scientific idea involves rational receptiveness.

It being clear that transmission cannot be fully described in intellectualistic terms, we are under the necessity of finding to what extent other factors participate. We have, so to speak, two parallel lines of succession; that represented by the biological term "heredity," as well as the line of tradition that has been under consideration. How these are able to interact in the production of a common result is the problem before us. An illustration from the biological field might not be inappropriate. Mr. Hudson has shown that young birds are frightened by any large, strange object, without distinction of kind. Older birds of the same species are frightened by the objects which are the natural enemies of the species. It is not necessary to suppose that the older birds have had an exhaustive experience of hawks in order to have the instinct thus specialised, but through the mediation of warning cries and a frequent repetition of the experience, the reaction is brought to bear only upon those objects where biological utility plays a part. This crude illustration points us to the general principle that hereditary organic equipment, especially as concerns the interests and emotions, is vague and undifferentiated. The function of experience is to draw out and polarise these tendencies with reference to the factors constituting the environment. For human beings this process appears long and exceedingly complicated. The human ability to retain not merely as habits, but in the shape of images, the greater part of experience affords opportunity for psychical organisation on a very large scale. The process has been carefully studied by Mr. Shand and embodied in his doctrine of the 'sentiments.' The leading principle is that the emotional life

becomes in the course of time definitely oriented toward factors of experience. Each of these emotional directions, as they might be called, depends upon a special organisation of almost the whole scale of emotions. The object loved induces joy in its presence, sorrow in its absence, fear for its danger and anger at any interfering object. In this way, the psychical life of the individual grows into definite relations with the world about. Our special applications of this doctrine are of two kinds: (1) the feelings are organically and not socially transmissible. (2) Social transmission involves in each individual a complete new series of adjustments in order to make reception possible. A great part of the social heritage consists of imaginative situations in legend, myth and the arts which make its component parts especially available as objects of emotional adjustment. Again, the fact that any social product commands in the community a common organisation of emotions, or in other words, is the object of a certain sentiment, is largely what gives it vitality as a social product. The love of the old, the love of one's country, or of the good, or of duty, or any other of the multiple forms of tradition,—all of these, organised in the minds of all the individuals concerned, make up the sum of social forces. But these habits of feeling cannot be called into existence merely by the presentation of some factor of tradition; it is necessary for them to grow. An illustration may be found in the most difficult problem that adolescence has to face, that of choosing a career. Where the youth has a free chance unhampered by parental interference, or the prospect of a ready-made career, as the civil service, all the possibilities of life present themselves to him in panoramic series. He pictures himself as occupying one after another the different functions of life, and in each case gives birth to an incipient sentiment which possibly fails of growth because the experience is imaginative, instead of real. He fancies himself as a sailor, as a soldier, an explorer, a barrister, a physician, a clergyman, a scholar, or a man of business. And in turn he tentatively constructs the organisation of emotional experience which the imagined series of situations would call forth. When the choice is made, the sentiment becomes fully grown and is the chief organising factor in the young man's life. This analysis exhibits the method by which so many sets of social factors are perpetuated. The great soldier is undoubtedly created by imaginatively living through the military experiences of past soldiers, and by the formation of self-love directed to a self which is in a measure substituted for the personages of the past. In some such

way careers of all kinds are propagated, and many types of action repeat themselves in successive generations.

While the term 'institution' is sufficiently vague to prevent definite application to specific cases in such a way as to make clear the principle that differentiates various kinds, still, for practical purposes there will be found a certain consensus as to the class of facts that the term covers. The institution possesses *par excellence* an historical continuity; its changes in the course of time are slow; and it manifests a certain compelling power in its contact with successive generations. This authoritative, compelling element has been singled out by Professor Durkheim as the differential mark characterising institutions. The feeling for authority as it manifests its different stages in the development of the child has been studied with care by Miss Darrah. The first period, lasting to the beginning of adolescence, is one of control by authority in the most absolute and arbitrary sense of the term. Reasons for prescribing or prohibiting various actions are not required, or even wanted. A thing is right because of approval by superiors, or wrong because of disapproval; there is no other standard. But the mark of this authority is the personal element without which it possesses no cogency. The basis underlying this attitude seems to be that of intelligent learning, that of gradually stamping in by experience the remembrance of activities with their pleasurable or painful consequences. Incidentally, it may be said that this principle furnishes the ground for Mr. Spencer's whole doctrine of moral education. To it should be added the tendency of childhood to interpret all causation in personal terms.

But the attitude towards authority changes as the child grows older developing into a susceptibility to new kinds of suasion. The period of early adolescence is that of participation in certain crude forms of organised activity. Control is by mates rather than by superiors. The sentiment of the gang, the team, or the school, or the boys' secret society, is most efficient with him now. This *esprit de corps*, or control by the mass of equals probably finds its basis in the principle of imitation. Later on, imitation tends to become discriminating and the personal element in some cases gradually drops out, initiating the age of control by ideas and ideals—the period of reason. It requires to be added that for the majority, sense of authority is arrested at this lower stage. The slight degree of rational responsiveness is supplemented by a certain amount of support by the crowd. The fully developed moral life implies the growth of sentiments whose objects are more

abstract moral qualities or judgments, as duty, justice and right. Let us now apply these results to the case of some institution like the Church. The present sensitiveness on the subject of religious education bears evidence that there is an unconscious recognition of these principles. The religious institution has created a number of minor aids to enable it to meet all requirements. Absolute personal control, the corporate feeling of the church-community are just as necessary as the body of doctrine. Besides this directly compelling power, there are other modes of meeting natural interests as they appear in the course of development. It will be noted that every great religion contains a mythology, a number of hero-legends, a body of doctrine, a concrete embodiment in buildings and fixtures, a ritual, and a priesthood. If we should look for the essence of the institution, it would be found in none of these singly, but in all together. Each exists because of the necessity of meeting human nature in its various aspects. Children in early years have little interest in the New Testament, but the lack is more than met by the mythology of the Old Testament. Again, in the story of the life of Jesus, it will be noted that incidents are included which range through the whole gamut of emotions, making New Testament religion peculiarly adaptable to the stage of adolescence. Then, the example of all the saints, each of them an *imitatio Christi*, furnishes the necessary set of personal ideals. This is far from saying that deliberate design has ever played a part in selecting these important elements; but it is that species of folk and historical selection necessary for the efficiency of an institution.

The intention of this paper has been to indicate facts sufficiently well-known in themselves, but certain of whose relations to each other have been disregarded. It was desired to point out certain limitations of the historical method. We require to be reminded that history is a human affair and that its forces exist because they are derived from human nature. Historical succession might be thought of as having the character of a curve, used in graphic representation to connect points, the value of each of which depends only partly upon the position of previous ones.

Our study further prepares us to consider the so-called recapitulation of racial development by the individual. There appears no sufficient ground for believing in the mind of the race, and it is a frequent source of fallacy to regard the race in this semi-personified way. The race consists of successive generations of individuals and mental development probably has the same stages throughout;

and a further advance in the way of mental acquisition implies only that the forces of development are hereditary in that individual and have met conditions favouring their fuller manifestation, these conditions consisting largely of the acquisitions of previous generations.

We have attempted to make clear the meaning of survival in folk-lore or custom, as finding its reason for continued existence in the satisfaction of needs actual and present. This illustrates the general type of transmission which must be understood not as the mere passing on of ideas, but as a re-creation with every new individual. To this process of reconstituting the body of culture, the whole period of individual growth is devoted.

J. W. SLAUGHTER.

THE TUTELAGE OF RACES.

There are two current views, one old, conventional and uncritical, but still common, the other modern and relatively scientific, on the moral tendency of the *imperium* of a dominant over a subject race. The first view may be represented in the words of the historian of the Roman wall¹:

"The Romans were not only great conquerors but they were wise and politic governors. They brought all the nations of the then known world into unity, and spread the blessings of order and civilisation to the very ends of the earth. The people of England are in this respect the successors of the Romans. Through their instrumentality vast continents, of the existence of which Cæsar never dreamt, have obtained the advantage of a well organised government; their rude inhabitants have been induced to engage in the pursuits of peaceful industry; and the blessings of Christianity have been pressed upon their attention."

There is here no hint of a suspicion that the Roman rule was otherwise than wholesome for the people of ancient Britâin, Gaul, Greece or Egypt. There is no glance at the fact that Gaul, Britain, Spain, Egypt and North Africa were left by Rome less capable of self-maintenance and self-defence than she found them. The simple fact of orderly dominion is held to be its own complete vindication.

The other and more critical view may be well indicated by a passage in Sir John Seeley's *Expansion of England*:

"Subjection for a long time to a foreign yoke is one of the most potent causes of national deterioration. And the few facts we know about the ancient Hindus confirm what we should conjecture about the moral effects produced upon them by their misfortunes. We have in the Greek writer Arrian a description of the Indian character, which we read with surprise. He says, 'they are remarkably brave, superior in war to all Asiatics; they are remarkable for simplicity and integrity; so reasonable as never to have recourse to law-suit and so honest as neither to require locks to their doors nor writings to bind their agreements. No Indian was ever known to tell an untruth.' This description has no doubt an air of exaggeration about it; but, as Elphinstone remarks, it shows that an extraordinary change has passed over the Hindu character since it was written. Exaggeration consists in exhibiting the real features larger than they ought to be. But this description exhibits on an

1. Dr. J. Collingwood Bruce, *Handbook of the Roman Wall*, preface to second edition.

unnatural scale precisely the features that are wanting in the modern Hindu character. Modern travellers, therefore, are found to exaggerate the very opposite features. They accuse the Hindu of want of veracity, want of valour, and extreme litigiousness. But the change is precisely such as might naturally be produced by a long period of submission to the foreigner."

The conception here set forth is diametrically opposed to the other. By what proportion of British citizens the two views are respectively held it seems impossible even to guess; but it is certain that Seeley's book was widely read and approved of; and I doubt whether the passage quoted would not now receive the entire assent of a majority of educated and thoughtful men everywhere if it were put to them. On the other hand, it seems quite certain that the popular and the official attitude in this country to the facts of British rule over India and Egypt are in terms of the other view. For it would be hard to discover any sign that any of the thousands who have read Seeley's book with general assent have been at all moved by it to call for any radical change in our methods of governing the two countries named. Many professed imperialists are known to approve highly of Seeley's general way of thinking: none of them, I think, has ever proposed that we should alter our policy in recognition of the truth of the teaching under notice.

Without professing such general approval, I find this particular proposition unchallengeable, and I shall here take it for granted. The most remarkable thing about it is that Seeley himself makes no attempt to relate the rest of his exposition to his avowal. It stands forth in his text isolated and as it were forgotten, a minatory finger-post which he himself no more regards. By his own explicit statement, "submission to the foreigner" tends to demoralise a race as nothing else does; and—though without seeming to realise the force of that confession—he allows in so many words that the empire in India is to be ranked¹—

"at best as a good specimen of a bad political system. We are not disposed to be proud of the succession of the Great Mogul. We doubt whether with all the merits of our administration the subjects of it are happy. We may even doubt whether our rule is preparing them for a happier condition, whether it may not be sinking them lower in misery; and we have our misgivings that perhaps a genuine Asiatic Government, and still more a national Government springing up out

1. Pages 236-7.

of the Hindu population itself, might in the long run be more beneficial because more congenial, though perhaps less civilised, than such a foreign unsympathetic government as our own."

On the other hand, he avows¹ emphatically that

"A population that rebels is a population that is looking up, that has begun to hope and to feel its strength. . . . If this feeling ever does spring up, if India does begin to breathe as a single national whole—and our rule is perhaps doing more than ever was done by former Governments to make this possible—then no such explosion of despair, even if there were cause for it, would be needed. For in that case the feeling would soon gain the native army, and on the native army ultimately we depend. We could subdue the mutiny of 1857, formidable as it was, because it spread through only a part of the army, because the people did not actively sympathise with it, and because it was possible to find native Indian races who would fight on our side. But the moment a mutiny is threatened which shall be no mere mutiny, but the expression of a universal feeling of nationality, at that moment all hope is at an end, as all desire ought to be at an end, of preserving our Empire. For we are not really conquerors of India, and we cannot rule her as conquerors; if we undertook to do so, it is not necessary to inquire whether we could succeed, for we should assuredly be ruined financially by the mere attempt."

Putting two and two together, we get so far the proposition that the submission to the foreigner is ruinous to Indian character; and that the general emergence of self-respect would mean the humiliating expulsion of the British. Going further afield, we find qualifying suggestions suggesting grounds of good hope which his previous words negate; and there is no solution of the problem. To close the matter, we ask whether our lecturer believes that the "raising" process which he posits as necessary is going on; and we find a virtual admission that it is not. "If India is really to be enlightened," admits Seeley, ²"evidently it must be through the medium neither of Sanskrit nor of English, but of the vernaculars." The context has been a confession of the "strange oversight" of the acceptance of Macaulay's decision that the choice of a teaching medium lay between Sanskrit or Arabic on the one hand and English on the other. Then we have this triumph of counter-sense:—

"But though this great oversight was made—it has since been remarked and, since the education dispatch of Sir Charles Wood in 1854, in some measure repaired—the decision to which Macaulay's minute led remains the great landmark in

the history of our Empire considered as an institute of civilisation. It marks the moment when we deliberately recognised that a function had devolved on us in Asia similar to that which Rome fulfilled in Europe, the greatest function which any Government can ever be called upon to discharge."

The average practitioner of the "bombastic" school at which Seeley has so many characteristic flings in his book, might at least retort that his bombast is normally the peroration to an account of something important alleged to be done, not to a record of how the one thing declared to be needful was not done. The reference to Rome is made with the same oblivion of Roman decadence as is exhibited by the historian of the Roman Wall. It is worded as if Rome had given a regenerating culture to the peoples over which she held sway; as if her own civilisation had not steadily sunk with that of the rest of the Mediterranean world which she held in tutelage; as if Seeley himself had not summed up the decay of the whole empire as a failure of the crop of men.

The "oversight" of which Seeley speaks has not been tolerably repaired to this day. Vernacular education in India can hardly be said yet to exist as an imperial concern. I take the testimonies of Sir Henry Cotton and Sir F. S. P. Lely:—

"The total expenditure on primary education from the funds of the State at the present time," says the former, "does not exceed £200,000. There is no free education: still less is it compulsory. Not more than one-sixth of the number of boys of school-going age are attending school, and there is only one primary school to five villages."¹

Sir Philip Lely at some points hotly denounces Sir Henry Cotton's view of things; but he too tacitly confesses to the destitution of the Indian peoples in the matter of vernacular schools:—

"The great task which lies at the doors of every provincial Administration is that of universal education. The people are getting ready for it. Government are committed to it. The only real difficulty is the cost. The local Boards, with their inelastic revenues, can go no further, and with all the other demands upon the provincial funds it will be a serious strain on them if they have to supply the balance even with occasional grants."²

The natives, Sir Philip remarks, "are eager to educate their boys"; and he is sure they would readily co-operate if, instead

1. *New India*, ed. 1907, page 126.

2. *Suggestions for the Better Government of India*, 1906, page 59.

of insisting upon a handsome bungalow or nothing, the Government would allow the provision of cheap and simple shelters, suited to native ways. But whatever the Government may be "committed to," the facts remain as stated by Sir Henry Cotton. And all the while, the Government never fails to provide for an enormous amount of expenditure upon the military department—an expenditure increased in 1906 on the ground, according to Lord Minto, that a great nation like Russia is more dangerous when badly defeated than at any other time. In fulfilment of the official formula, the peoples of India are carefully protected against a Russian invasion, which, in terms of the Budget, is inferribly the greatest calamity that could happen to them. But to give more than a fraction of them even a smattering of vernacular education is more than the protecting Government can achieve.

It is inexpedient to ask whether or not the bureaucracy in general, or the upper authorities in particular, desire to see the masses in India schooled. Taking simply the inductive method that would be followed in any judicial enquiry as to home administration, we are however forced to conclude that no such ideal guides our Indian administration as is supposed to govern the policy of most European Governments. In home politics, all parties profess to applaud the maxim that "where there is no light the people perish." It is acclaimed as a religious truth alike by those who maintain the Nonconformist ideal of religious education and by those who insist upon the Anglican. And that section of our Labour party whom our Minister of Education in 1906 apostrophised, when quoting the maxim as a plea for religious training in the schools, are at least as much concerned as he to create popular light by way of secular schooling. But no party in this country is concerned to note that under our rule in India the measure of such light supplied to the vast mass of the people is what would pass here for darkness visible.

No doubt the authorities are in some cases honestly satisfied that Hindus are better without schools than with them, and will reason to that effect. Such views have often been put forward in good faith as against demands for compulsory or free schooling in Europe, and they are at least as likely to be honestly held by Europeans in regard to Asiatics. But the general European practice must be held to indicate the general European conviction. For scientific purposes, at least, we are forced to note that our tutelage of subject races, as regards India, involves a minimum of culture for them, and this after Japan has had a compulsory

school law for a generation, with some approach to efficient working.

To this destitution there is an offset in the work actually done upon Macaulay's lines, to wit, the building up of an English-speaking class among the educated section in most parts of India. In this way our rule has created a factor of nationalisation which could not conceivably have arisen otherwise in a population speaking so many different tongues. And if this factor were consciously fostered by our administration, it would be a thing for which Hindu patriots would have cause to be thankful. But as soon as it is seen to work vigorously, the attitude of the ruling class, instead of testifying to satisfaction, becomes one of apprehension and hostility. The creation of a national sentiment, in terms of Seeley's generalisation, nay, in terms of Macaulay's ideal, would be the greatest service that England could render to India. But it is perhaps unnecessary to say that the growth of national sentiment in India is the very last thing which the average official, high or low, wants to see; and that not a gleam of official recognition has ever been given to the organisation which best expresses the aspirations of educated Hindus—the Indian National Congress.

II.

Still keeping to the educational test, let us consider the effects of our tutelage of alien races elsewhere than in India, beginning with the course followed towards the coloured races of South Africa by our colonists. In Natal, in 1897-98, there were 182 State-aided schools for natives with a total attendance of 10,248, out of a native population of 787,000; the Government grants in aid amounting to £5,569, while the native hut tax yielded £129,596. In 1904-5, the figures were: 165 State-aided schools, with a total attendance of 10,150; the grants in aid amounting to £6,334. Thus the attendance is stationary; the schools are fewer, though the grant is slightly increased; while the native population has increased within the years named from 787,000 to 910,000. And those who have sojourned in Natal are well aware that the policy thus indicated stands for the balance of opinion among the colonists, many of whom vehemently argue that to educate the native is to give the white notice to quit.

In Cape Colony in 1891, out of a native population of 753,824, described in the census return as of "no religion," with 316,152 children between 5 and 14, some 34,000 were taught in Government schools. In 1904, out of a native population of over

1,500,000, with nearly 500,000 children between 5 and 14, 73,000 were taught in Government schools. Here the results are conspicuously better than in Natal; and the fact that in Cape Colony alone have the natives any parliamentary representation tells the whole story of the differentiation. He would be a confident optimist who should predict that with a rapidly increasing native population the superiority in Cape Colony will be steadily maintained; but if it should be, the difference will still be attributable not to tutelage pure and simple but to the element of self-government for natives in the Cape constitution.

But the most dramatic illustration of the effect of foreign rule on subject races on the side of culture is supplied by Egypt. In 1883, under the Khedive Tewfik, £103,000 was allotted to the Egyptian education department; but the bond-holders of Europe obtained a reduction of the sum by £35,000, which was appropriated to meeting their claims. Here the whole weight of Europe was thrown in the scale against the Egyptian schooling; and the sum left, in proportion to the population, was of the nature of an alms. There is, therefore, nothing specially English in the policy in question. But our administration of Egypt in the period of our control shows us in our tutelary capacity to have wrought worse for Egyptian culture than France had done in a non-tutelary relation. The most startling of all contrasts in the relation of forward and backward races is that between the military dominion of France over Algeria and her purely ancillary relation to Egypt. The former is from every point of view one of the worst cases of coercion in history; the latter one of the best instances of beneficent moral influence. Called in as instructors, as legists, as engineers, as administrators, Frenchmen were from the time of Mehemet Ali the guides and friends of Egyptian civilisation; and it was rather the folly of Ismail than any sinister influence of his European instruments that led to the enormous debt which ultimately put his country under European tutelage. And up to the time of the English control the effects on Egyptian culture were distinctly promising. French had become the language of society, and the youth of the official class learned it accurately by daily converse. At the same time, while elementary schooling was very scanty, provision was made for the higher education by sending annually to Europe—chiefly to France—a number of students in law, medicine, and other branches, who went through a university course. The arrangement was known as the French Mission. There was thus provided for Egypt an educated class,

abreast of contemporary European science, and capable of communicating that science to their countrymen in the native tongue. It did not mean any wide diffusion of science, but it meant the creation of possibilities for Arab-speaking youth. And any one who will consult the catalogue of the Khedivial Library at Cairo will find some hundreds of works in Arabic, from the time of Mehemet Ali onwards, consisting of translations or adaptations of European treatises in each and all of the sciences, as well as in history, logic and philosophy. In some cases the work is essentially original, yet scientific. Thus the work of enlightenment was actually going on in the period before direct tutelage began.

Under the British control, however, all this is changed. The French Mission was abandoned as soon as possible; and, apart from any changes quite recently made, nothing has been systematically substituted for it beyond the despatch of a few Egyptian teachers to an English normal school. At the same time the former teaching of the sciences in Arabic has been abolished. Law is still taught in French and to some extent in Arabic—the latter for ecclesiastical purposes—but the physical sciences are with hardly any exception taught solely in English; and in the secondary schools botany, biology, and physiology are not taught at all. In the school of agriculture, all the teachers use English. Thus in Egypt, preeminently an agricultural country, no native can obtain scientific instruction even in agriculture in his own tongue. But the other sciences are in the same case. After three generations in which the physical sciences were taught in Arabic by natives who had been trained at European universities, the exclusion of all save bi-lingual Egyptians from the means of scientific instruction is officially justified on the pretext that there do not exist in Arabic the technical terms required to teach the modern sciences.

It seems necessary to pause over this ingenious proposition, because many educated people seem to be impressed by it, and the present Foreign Secretary repeats it in all good faith without the slightest misgiving. It would be hard, however, to formulate a more futile sophism. Students are aware that fresh scientific terms are framed from year to year out of the two absolutely dead languages, Latin and Greek. These terms are either transliterated or translated into the various living tongues. When transliterated they are defined, and have technical currency. In the case of certain languages, however, notably in German, many

such terms are vernacularised, as: *Sauerstoff* (sour-stuff) for oxygen; *Wasserstoff* (water-stuff) for hydrogen; *eiweisshaltig* (white-of-egg-holding) for albuminous; and so on. Now, both of those procedures are as open to Arabic-speaking peoples as to any other; and in point of fact the modern sciences have been put in Arabic, and taught in Arabic, for whole generations. There are in Egypt still a number of scientific and otherwise cultured natives who can so teach them. If the Anglo-Egyptian excuse for teaching the sciences only in English were valid, it would follow that the record of the assimilation and diffusion of Greek science and philosophy by the Saracens in the Dark Ages is a myth. The historic fact is that both the philosophy and the science of the Greeks reached Christendom substantially through the Arabic; and that the beginnings of chemistry and the first modern advances of astronomy were made by the Arabs, using their own language, as many of our chemical terms plainly testify. Arabic is in point of fact, as any Orientalist will tell, one of the richest languages in existence. And not the slightest pretence has been made of showing that the sciences were fallaciously taught either in the schools or in the Arabic books before the period of the English control, by reason of difficulties about turning scientific terms into Arabic or expressing scientific ideas in that tongue.

The official pretext is in fact beneath serious discussion. On one occasion when I asked the Foreign Secretary whether the existence of scores of modern scientific works, written in Arabic by Egyptian teachers and professors certified for competence by European universities, was not a proof that the difficulty of terminology was imaginary, he quite seriously answered that we could not tell unless we read the books in question. Now, when a previous query had been put as to why the sciences are not taught in Arabic to Egyptians, the answer was that the books did not exist. Thus the demand for rational justice is by our bureaucracy in Egypt dodged from pillar from post. The whole procedure is one of evasion—I do not mean on the part of the Foreign Secretary, who simply puts forward the case given him by the Egyptian autocracy—but on the part of that autocracy. The British control has lasted for over twenty years: and the French *entente*, which gave the Consul-General a free hand, has lasted for four years. If then it were desired to convey scientific knowledge in Arabic, new books could have been produced ten times over. The only remaining pretext is the implicit proposition that the Arabic language is incapable of evolving scientific terms; and that is flat absurdity.

We are left then with the fact that under our control no Egyptian can obtain instruction in science in his own language. Here again there is an ostensibly well-meaning pretext—the pretext, namely, that by making English almost the sole vehicle of the higher education in Egypt we secure the instruction of the pupils of the secondary schools in English. Now, in the case of India, as we have seen, English has played and may play an important part as a factor of unification among races speaking different tongues. But in Egypt there exists no such difficulty; and the policy of forcing English as a medium of instruction must find another justification. What justification is there, apart from the untenable pretences we have already discussed? Simply this, that native officials capable of speaking English are required for the public service. But obviously the proper way to teach English to students destined for the civil service is not to force them to limit their instruction in science or even in history or geography to the English medium. In no country in the world are foreign languages taught on that principle. Common-sense suggests that if in order to teach our children French or German, we gave them in those languages all the higher education they received, they would miss proper culture in their mother tongue, whether or not they mastered the others.

And this is what has happened in Egypt. Whatever be the official origination of the policy of teaching the sciences in English, there is an abundance of private testimony from English civil-servants in Egypt to the effect that under the present system the Egyptian youth master neither English nor science; and, I may add, they are prevented from mastering Arabic. Here we have another object lesson in the problem of race tutelage. While the French were the helpers and chosen instructors of Egypt, French was mastered by numbers of the educated natives, who spoke it in their homes and in society, and so brought up their children to speak it. Meantime, however, the boys were being fully instructed in Arabic in their schools. What they knew of history, geography, mathematics, and the sciences, was learned in their own tongue. Those who were destined to give instruction in the law or medical schools, or in the training colleges, were sent to France: and there, on a basis of colloquially acquired French, they mastered the higher French, and thereby the matter of their studies, during a period of five years. Thereafter, returning home, they could and did convey in their native tongue the knowledge they had acquired in another.

Contrast this with what happens to-day. As soon as the boy reaches the secondary school his instruction is almost wholly limited to English, a language which he does not speak at home, and which he acquires academically. He is most conscientiously trained, whether by English or native teachers, to parse and analyse; and he does this with surprising accuracy; yet all the while, as I personally ascertained by visiting a number of the schools in Cairo and elsewhere, he is in the dark on points of idiom which to an English boy would present no difficulty. Thus he studies the unknown—science—through an imperfectly known medium. Meanwhile, receiving none of his higher culture in Arabic, he never properly develops the command of his own tongue. The higher vocabulary remains strange to him. What he hears at home, while he is a boy, is the limited and unliterary Arabic of the harem. For him, his native speech is never the vehicle of the higher forms of thought and knowledge; at best he knows it in the sacrosanct form of the Koran, which he can never handle with scholarly mastery precisely because he has been kept on an unscholarly plane in all other use of Arabic. Thus he is deliberately withheld from the scientific application of his language by those supervisors who plead as their excuse that his language has not been scientifically applied. The policy is a mere vicious circle, and the outcome, naturally, is failure, even from the tutelary point of view.

Meanwhile, a native project for a modern university has been effectively discouraged by the British control on the score that it is "premature"; and, as we have seen, the whole system of secondary education is calculated to paralyse the higher culture, and to arrest the growth of that national self-knowledge and self-respect which is the proper outcome of every system of education. Whatever the mass may learn in *kuttab*s—and it is sadly little thus far—the native youth of the class ostensibly destined to do the work of public administration are as it were deracinated and deracialised.

This system, be it observed, is forced on the Egyptian people, not as a result of any deliberation either by trained educationists or by responsible legislators, but as the expression of the individual will of a Consul-General, to whom the home Government on principle has allowed a "free hand." In educational science he has had no training or competence whatever. His plan, then, is not to be taken as an average illustration of the tutelage of subject races by dominant races: it is indeed inconceivable that

any European legislature could enact it. But the plan, such as it is, is framed in the interests of a tutelary system; and it is approved of by a number of irresponsible Anglo-Egyptians as tending to facilitate the process of Anglicising the administration of Egypt. How so inadequate a method of English instruction can satisfy the English bureaucracy in general is hard to see; but the idea seems to be that the first requisite is a supply of inferior and other officials who shall know English enough to be possible assistants for English officials who do not know Arabic.

For the Anglicisation of the Egyptian civil service proceeds apace: the number of English officials in nearly every department constantly increases, despite the ostensible policy of giving an English education to the natives; and there is no perceptible progress whatever towards that ideal of autonomy which has all along been proclaimed by the British control as its guiding motive. This fact brings us to the consideration of the final crux of the régime of tutelage—an anomaly more glaring in Egypt than in any dependency proper of the British Crown, inasmuch as there is in that case not only no pretence of right to empire but an avowed purpose of ultimately ceasing from occupation.

III.

The constitutional situation in Egypt is broadly as follows:—Two Chambers without legislative powers, indirectly elected, were established by Lord Dufferin in 1883. They still remain without legislative function, their sole form of power being the capacity vested in one of them to veto a new tax. As the increasing revenue from existing sources affords the Government the means of increased outlay, this power counts for nothing. The country is ruled under a system of ministers who are nominally appointed by the Khedive, but really by the British Consul-General, and who are further practically subordinate to British "advisers," who see that they carry out in every detail the Consul-General's orders. Under some of the forms of independence there is really a more complete system of tutelage, as regards all native administration, than obtains in India, where a certain number of natives hold comparatively responsible positions. Thus all the evils recognised to follow in India from alien domination tend to arise in Egypt, where, to begin with, a past of oriental despotism and Turkish intervention had created a sufficiently unhealthy socio-political atmosphere. It has been, accordingly, a maxim of Lord Cromer's that "what is needed in Egypt is

character"; and here at least the sociological onlooker can cordially agree with him.

But how is national and social "character" to be created? What are the political and other conditions fitted to evoke it, whether in the east or west? Is there any case in the whole history of mankind in which the quality desiderated is found to have been produced in a people under an alien rule? Not once has Lord Cromer or any one of his English eulogists hinted at any instance or any possibility of the kind. According to one of his chief administrators, Captain Machell, the "prosperity" of the Egyptian fellaheen is bringing about a serious increase in crime. "Where there is no light the people perish." All the while it is for promoting this very prosperity that our imperialists take credit and demand gratitude. Crux upon crux. Our service to Egypt is a disservice, by official testimony; our demand for character is a demand that can be met only by a gradual but systematic evocation of the faculty of self-rule. In other words, a gradual preparation for our own withdrawal. For twenty years Lord Cromer has been more or less explicitly indicating such a view of the situation; and all the while has taken not one measurable step in the direction indicated. His successor is reported to have officially proclaimed the same ideal in plain terms. Meantime the British Government, with whom the decision is supposed to rest, appear to give no instructions; and the British press, which is supposed to prelude or prepare the policies of British Governments, is for the most part either strictly neutral or acridly contemptuous of Egyptian aspirations for even the smallest measure of self-rule. When the question was raised last year in the House of Commons Sir Edward Grey replied, truly enough, that the art of government is something you cannot teach; adding that at the same time he did not wish to discourage the ultimate ideal of developing the habits of self-government in the people. Most readers presumably will agree to the proposition that "the art of self-government is something you cannot teach," and would proceed to conclude that it is accordingly something you must be content to let people learn for themselves, as they learn to swim, taking precautions simply that the experiment is duly gradual, and is begun in shallow water. Nothing of the sort is being done. What has been done is to refuse, under the name of statesmanlike caution, to let the Egyptians have any share whatever in the government of their country, and to put them off with circular platitudes. It is quite clear that no move-

ment will be made by the British Government save in response to energetic agitation by the Egyptian people; and all the while any such agitation is viewed with apprehension or bitterness, which many imperialists are eager to translate into active repression. The cue is given as regards Egypt by the policy latterly pursued in India. There, too, we have the cry for "character"; and the solutions of nescience and impotence have been categorically propounded. "We must," says one writer, "wearily retrace our steps and devote our energies to educating the Indians in character and common-sense. Then, and not till then, can we put them out into the polytechnic of self-government." We must wait "until generations of really educated Indians have come and gone."¹ That is to say, while we cannot "teach government" we can teach "character," and this by giving so-called education without power or possibility of self-governing action for many generations. Meantime we are not procuring even the elements of education for 90 per cent. of the people: and our reactionary officials are complaining that what we give in the way of higher education tends to produce Babus and lawyers.

Students of Indian life know that in many provinces the common people were in "the polytechnic of local self-government" before we came, and we have taken them out of it. They had their system of village self-government, which was as important a school of political education as any gone through by our race; and that system we have swept away. Conceive a similar procedure on the part of imperial Rome in ancient Germany; conceive it justified by the plea that what was needed among the primitives was "character," and that "we" must wait for the passage of many generations of educated Teutons before they could be allowed to try experiments in self-governing—and you would have a tolerable parallel to the spectacle presented by our bureaucrats, who point to the demoralisation they create as a decisive reason for continuing to create it.

The first symptoms of that racial self-respect which it should be our pleasure to see arising as one of the natural factors of "character," are made the pretext for new repression, and we witness in India, in the words of Sir Henry Cotton,

"Legislation designed to curtail the liberty of the press and speech; the crusade against so-called sedition; the attempt to abolish trial by jury; the forcible introduction of harsh plague

1. Quoted by Sir Henry Cotton, *New India*, ed. 1907, page 203.

regulations, subsequently withdrawn; the blows that have been dealt at local self-government, especially in Calcutta; the systematic discouragement of popular institutions; the deliberate encouragement of provincial segregation; the substitution of a system of nomination to government service in the place of competitive examination; the practical declaration of race-disqualification for public offices; the hampering and fettering of unaided colleges and schools, and the general sinister drift in favour of officialising all branches of education; and above all, the recent partition of Bengal, which was not only carried out in direct opposition to the wishes of the people, and in spite of their most vigorous protests, but was enforced with a degree of harshness and want of sympathy which are fortunately rare in the annals of Indian administration."¹

That which at home we call "popular demand for reform," in India we call "sedition"; and the average Briton to-day stands in that regard where most reactionary Tories stood in British politics a hundred years ago. The one thing that neither press nor public will attempt is to do in relation to the claims of subject races as it would be done by. The circle seems hopeless, so far as British initiative is concerned. To proclaim ideals which we helplessly falsify by our action; to demand gratitude which is not conceded; to claim to protect and elevate backward races while steadily lowering them in the scale of manhood—such appears to be our tutelary destiny. If we do otherwise it will apparently not be of our own will.

IV.

Putting aside practical problems, and seeking only to reach a sociological conclusion, we seem constrained to infer that in so far as any race or nation has to be under the tutelage of another, the slighter the tutelage the better for both. A complete control tends to abuse the ruled and to demoralise the ruler. The good that may be done by simple culture-contact, by the voluntarily undergone influence of the more civilised race, apart from any species of coercion, is incalculable. The evil that is done by a complete and arbitrary domination, on the other hand, is such as apparently to outweigh any of the benefits it conveys. By the admissions of Sir Philip Lely and of many another Anglo-Indian ex-official, "there is as much content and prosperity, because more knowledge, under the go-as-you-please orders of a native state as under a 'policy' thrice tried in the Secretariate fire and carried

1. Work cited, pages 6-7.

out by departmental battalions."¹ The planning of the Secretariate, he admits, is very able; but those able and well-intentioned gentlemen, as we might put it here, have studied everything except sociology. And indeed they are hardly to be blamed, for it was never taught to them. Macpherson² declared that his success in putting down human sacrifice among the Khonds was due to his study of Guizot; but it is not on such studies that our youth are prepared for the Indian civil service. And, indeed, no mere study will prepare a multitude of average young men, of whom only a few are likely to be gifted with humane political genius, to manage successfully the affairs of a vast congeries of alien races held in tutelage. Let us not finally ascribe our countrymen's failure to their idiosyncrasy; it is incident to their task and to their normality.

But so long as hope remains, we must continue to demand, as the first condition of any betterment, the effort to do as we would be done by. It is an experienced official who, earnestly pleading for more sympathy in Indian administration, thus suggests an exercise in the psychics of reciprocity.

"Suppose that in England foreigners were ruling, say the Japanese, who committed the province to one of their statesmen who had never been in Europe before, and surrounded him with a group of men of his own race who got their knowledge of the country chiefly from books and papers from Whitehall, who for the most part could not talk the English language, whose unreserved intercourse with Englishmen was limited to a few Japanese-speaking callers in London, and who, when not in London, divided their time between the Scottish Highlands and the Riviera. What sort of Government would it be? It might seem admirable to the people in Tokio, but would it to the men of Yorkshire and Cornwall? How long would it last?"³

A change of heart in an entire bureaucracy, it is true, is not to be proposed as a practicable policy or a likely achievement; but those who can see the need for it may also see the need for altering the bureaucrats' equation from without.

And only such a change, be it added, seems sufficient to save from progressive abasement the Zulu population of Natal, where the relation of White to Black appears to be rapidly approximating to the worst of all forms—that of an equal degree of hate and fear on the part of the ruling race, with no upward outlook

1. Work cited, page 47.

2. *Memorials of Service in India*, 1865, page 351.

3. Sir F. S. P. Lely, as cited, page 39.

whatever for the inferior. As I write these lines I have before me two extracts from the Natal press of 12th December.

"Apart from Dinizulu's guilt or innocence of the criminal charges," says the *Times of Natal*, "political reasons necessitate his deportation; otherwise there will be danger of a periodical recrudescence of unrest. If the imperial Government refuses this, the onus of taking adequate measures to ensure the protection of whites in Zululand devolves upon the imperial Government."

And the *Natal Mercury* expounds the same ethic:—

"Even should Dinizulu establish his innocence, we must still consider whether it is desirable to permit his continued presence in the country."

These edifying utterances serve to remind us of the fate of the Redskins of North America during three centuries. For a primitive race there is no security whatever save in a segregation which shall leave them free to profit by the example of their neighbours without coming under their power. On this principle the Basutos of Cape Colony were entirely withdrawn from the provocative control of the Colonial Government and set apart under an imperial protection which means a minimum of tutelage, giving them thus some prospect of comparatively healthy evolution. This is one of the few cases in which imperial tutelage of a backward race may relatively avail for good as against mere exploitation by a frontier colony. But inasmuch as the advantage is by way of substituting simple protection for habitual interference, it makes good our conclusion that thus far all administrative tutelage of one race by another is noxious to the higher life of both.

JOHN M. ROBERTSON.

DISCUSSIONS.

I. SOCIOLOGY AND ETHICS.¹

The relation of Sociology to Ethics, is perhaps the most difficult issue which confronts that embryonic science. It is sometimes urged that Sociology, like any other Science, is concerned only with facts and their relations; and that it has nothing to do with values except as psychological data. And this no doubt is the simplest point of view. If it were consistently adopted, it would do for Sociology what Bentham and his followers did for Jurisprudence, and what the later Economists have tried to do for their science. It would eliminate a disconcerting subjective factor, though at the cost of eliminating also a great part of the interest and importance of the study. From this standpoint Sociology might be able to discover the laws of the development of social ideals; in any case it would be its business to give a historical account of their sequence; and this, in fact, mainly, is what Sociologists now profess to attempt. On the other hand, the great founders of the science, Turgot, Condorcet, Saint-Simon, Comte, Spencer, had it clearly as their main inspiration to define the goal towards which society ought to move. And this other purpose is constantly peeping out even in treatises which formally disavow it. That the Later is also the Better is a preconception so inveterate in modern thought that it is not commonly recognised as such; and authors who imagine themselves to be severely descriptive in their method would be amazed if they could realise how completely their chain of reasoning would fall to pieces if this secret thread of connection were cut. To abstract from valuations in dealing with human society is more difficult than is commonly realised. Perhaps, however, Sociology ought to do so; at any rate, if it did, it would be an easier though a less attractive and exciting pursuit.

If, on the other hand, Sociology purposes to be a normative, as well as a descriptive science, it becomes implicated at once in all the difficulties which attach to the study of Ethics. For the short cuts which it has sometimes attempted are mere misdirections. There comes up, for instance, again and again the assumption, explicit or implicit, that that conduct must be good which enables a society to survive. This is to beg the whole question. A pessimist holds, on the contrary, that only that conduct is good which tends to destroy the society. He may be wrong, but he cannot be proved to be wrong; and a Sociology which simply sets him aside is no longer a science, it is a creed. This point need not be laboured, partly because it is obvious, partly because pessimism does not practically interest most western men. But, even if we neglect the pessimist, what may be called "survival-ethics" does not really take us far. Mr. Leslie Stephen, for

1. "The Science of Ethics." by Leslie Stephen. 2nd Edition. Smith Elder and Co.

example, attempts to show that the qualities which we in the West call virtues are identical with those which make for survival. But are they? That they are not incompatible with survival is sufficiently obvious, since, for good or evil, those who do possess them have survived. But the Indians, and in particular the Bengalees, have survived too, and show no intention of disappearing. Have they our virtues? Are they, for instance, what we call courageous, or energetic, or efficient, or truthful? Most Englishmen who know them emphatically deny it. On the other hand, the Bengalees have, no doubt, quite other virtues which we do not possess. Yet both we and they are here, and show every intention of continuing to be here. What reason have we then, on the hypothesis of survival-ethics, to think we have proved our code to be the true one?

At this point the ground will probably be changed. We shall be told that our virtues have made us the conquering race, and theirs have made them our subjects. Excellent! But then, the ground is changed. The survival-criterion is abandoned, and we are now asserting that the good conduct is that which enables one to be a conqueror, not a subject. The vanquished survive as much as the victors, the slaves as much as, or perhaps more than the masters. But what we are meaning now by Virtue is the quality that makes for power. This, however, is a dogma. No doubt, when we have once assumed it, we can proceed to illustrate from history what kind of moral code is the code of power. But our dogma underlies the whole investigation, whether we are aware of it or not; and we are no longer simply pursuing a science, we are also developing the implications of a creed.

But another method may be suggested; that which, if I understand him rightly, is adopted by Mr. Hobhouse in his recent work "Morals in Evolution." We may pursue two parallel lines of enquiry. On the one hand we may trace the growth of customs, institutions, manners and morals; on the other hand, that of ethical theory. We might be able then to find that the two lines coincide. But what are we to conclude? Mr. Hobhouse, I think, would reply that we have now an objective ethical basis; that the direction in which both fact and thought have spontaneously moved may be inferred to be the right one. And in this argument I should admit there is a kind of psychological compulsion. If everybody is moving in a given direction, and everybody is maintaining it to be the right one, it is only natural to fall in with the crowd, especially if one is already on that side, as most people are. But Mr. Hobhouse would probably admit a logical lacuna. What about the man who says "you're all wrong," and acts accordingly? Have you any kind of argument, other than the hangman's noose, to apply to him? You will of course call him a decadent, a lunatic, or a criminal, and I do not dispute your right to do so. But, once more, it is then the dogmatist, not the sociologist who speaks. Nietzsche is a classical case in point. We may or may not agree with him; for my own part I disagree profoundly, at any rate with his social philosophy. But it would never occur to me that I could refute him, or that Mr. Hobhouse, or any sociologist, could refute him. Here is a man who looks back calmly on the history of the world and instead of calling it, as our fashion is,

a process of improvement, denounces it as a process of decadence. Everything that to Mr. Leslie Stephen or to Mr. Hobhouse is a sign of advance, is to him a sign of retrogression. The weakening of social barriers, the fusion of classes, the equalisation of the sexes, the restriction of the area, duration, and brutality of war, all in short, that is involved in what we call "Democracy," is, to him, pure unadulterated Evil. All the "virtues" it presupposes and fosters he regards as vices. Life, he maintains, is going downhill as hard as it can, and has been going downhill for an indefinite period. It will never be on the up-grade until there arises a set of men who will seize upon power, reduce all other men to be their slaves, and govern the world in their own interest. When these propositions are laid before a modern man, whether he be an ethical philosopher, a Sociologist, or the man in the street, he dismisses them with an irritation or contempt proportional to his interest in the subject. And no one can complain of that. My point is that against such a man as Nietzsche—a man of genius, as all honourable opponents must admit—the armoury of any possible Sociologist is powerless. The course of history, the consensus of mankind, for all that he does not care a rush. "This is how I see it," he says, "this is my Good. It is nothing to me that you have numbers on your side; numbers are always on the wrong side. It is nothing to me that you plead your doctrine of survival. If it were true it would be irrelevant; but it is not true. Societies based on slavery have survived far longer than those which you call free, and may quite well come up and survive again. A fig for your arguments! We are here to fight! Kill me, if you can!" Now in Ethics I believe that to be the last word. We may buttress up our beliefs with every kind of extraneous aid; we may show that history is with us, that common-sense is with us; and these, no doubt, are comforting reflections. But at bottom what we are resting upon is our own conviction, the dogma of our personality. The dogma is worth as much as that is worth. And the ultimate service done by a man like Nietzsche is to make us realise this truth. But, if that be so, there can never be a science of Ethics, in the sense of a basing of this ultimate judgment upon something else. It itself is always there, supporting the other arguments. And my conclusion is that if Sociology is going to include Ethics it will be something that is not and cannot be a science, if science be a statement of the laws of what happens, or if it have any logical cogency to compel assent. In all this there is, of course, nothing new. I am not sure that it is not a series of tedious platitudes. But Sociologists, so far as I know their works, seem often to confuse two radically different attitudes, that of the man of science and that of the ethical dogmatist. I think it desirable that this confusion should stop. And that must be my excuse for publishing this review.

G. LOWES DICKINSON.

II. THE CHILD CRIMINAL.

The *Children's Bill*, introduced by Mr. Herbert Samuel, M.P., the Under Secretary of State for the Home Department, opens a new chapter in an important branch of the history of English jurisprudence. "The law," as Mr. Herbert Samuel has said, "relating to the punishment and restraint of child offenders is spread over a number of statutes and is in a state of some confusion. In certain points it is out of harmony with the more rational and more humane ideas, which have become general in recent times, on the degree of criminality which properly attaches to a wrongful act done by a child, and on the right way of dealing with it."

How has the child come to be considered a criminal? Under the Roman law it was responsible only to its father or guardian. When did it become responsible to the State and when did the State assume responsibility for the child?

Under a system found among primitive peoples, possession of the Child is the function of the mother's group known to anthropologists as mother-right. This is changed by transition to father-right. The *Couvade* or "hatching" process is among primitive tribes the pretence of the father to have given birth himself to his new-born child and is an explanation of the father's personal right to the possession of his children.

The Hindu Code of Manu compared the mother to the field bringing forth the plant according to whatever seed is sown in it. The plea of Orestes was that he was not of kin to his mother, Klytemnestra, and the Gods decided that she who bears the child is but as a nurse to it. Swedenborg declared that the soul which is spiritual and is the real man, is from the father while the body which is natural, as it were the clothing of the soul, is from the mother. The assimilation of the wife as a chattel or property of the husband gave the father even still closer guardianship over his child.

The Patriarchal possession and complete jurisdiction over the child was the same as the more primitive; the intention of Abraham to sacrifice Isaac is an instance. The Romans also recognised this right, until offering a child in sacrifice was made a capital offence by Valentinian, Valens and Gratian. But the killing was in certain cases justified; the power of life and death belonged to the paterfamilias and was especially mentioned in the XII. Tables. For minor offences imprisonment and flogging to any degree of severity were permitted. Seneca called the paterfamilias *Judex domesticus* or *magistratus domesticus*. The right to kill his offspring undoubtedly belonged to the Roman father. Previous to the reign of Constantine fathers had been rebuked for cruelty, but not until his reign was infanticide declared murder. In the time of Trajan, Hadrian and Alexander, fathers were liable for excessive punishment of their children and provisions were made against the sale of children. Instead of despots and owners, fathers became the natural protectors and guardians of their children, under the Roman law, but it never went so far as to give independence to the child.

Full age in Roman law was 25, and minors were subdivided

into adults, who had attained to puberty, and pupils, males under 14 and females under 12, all children under 7 being called infants. As a general rule, legitimate children were *alieni juris* under the power of their father; illegitimate children were *sui juris*, the law admitting no relationship to the father and recognising only the mother, which is the English law of to-day.

The *patria potestas* and the "family" in the Indo-Germanic races were on a broader basis, and the maternal side was an important portion of the family. Emancipation of the child was achieved merely by coming of age, not through the formalities required by the Roman law. The duty of the German father was to represent his child before the Courts, prosecute for injuries done to the child and amend injuries done by it. The "family" in the early Societies of the Indo-Germanic race down to, and into, Saxon England was the most important institution of "Private Law," originating, as some think, both "the State" and "the Law," and standing at the bottom of the whole police and criminal system. A type of the "family," or "clan," in a somewhat wider sense may be seen in the Commune of France, the German petty principalities, the Indian Village Communities, and also the local Courts of the shire and hundred in Saxon England, which were found by the Norman Conquerors but strengthened by them under the jurisdiction of the King's Court as in England to-day. Here we find the Tribunals somewhat varied and yet very similar, before which so vast a multitude of criminals, minors as well as adults, of both sexes, have been arraigned in the full blaze of mediæval "justice" from early days to the present. Many causes and complicated circumstances must be reviewed in order to reach any very clear or definite idea as to how the State assumed its more parental guardianship over minors.

In France there remains a most valued part of the legal system of the State, jealously protected since early times—the *Conseil de Famille*, arising out of an elaborate code of domestic legislation, the development of mediæval or even earlier customs. The oldest documents relating to it are of the 15th century. The presiding Judge heard the testimony of syndics; (rural or municipal functionaries replaced in 1789 by State-paid *Juges de Paix*), as well as that of the children's relatives. The origin of this Patriarchal system is traceable to Roman law and to the Gallic "family." It can be described as that of a guardian of guardians, an assemblage of next of kin, called together and presided over by the *Juge de Paix*, on behalf of minors, orphans, those mentally incapacitated, or incorrigible. French law constitutes the *Juge de Paix* the natural protector of the minors; the sittings are considered private and no publicity is given. Here we have what might represent the now much advocated "Children's Court," except that the *Conseil de Famille* holds aloof from criminal cases, concerning itself only with the civil affairs of minors.

In England no vestige of any similar tribunal appears; the jurisdiction of the English Court alone seems to have been sought at all times in family disputes, and in the cases of minors. The subject must here be considered from two points of view: (1) The law as it has effected the guardianship of minors with property, and (2) The law as it has effected pauper minors. The former

came, in course of time, under the guardianship of the State, through the Court of Chancery, the latter under the guardianship of the State, through the Poor Law, administered at first through the magistrates, and at all times in close relationship with the Criminal Law and the Criminal Courts. The State, therefore, began to assert its guardianship over vast numbers of the children and youth of the country through the Criminal Law, the Poor Laws, and later by the Education Acts. That this right of the State which it has so largely assumed, was ever legal or justified at Common Law, might be successfully disputed even now. A father is by law entitled to the guardianship of his legitimate children and a Court of Common Law has no jurisdiction to deprive him of that right. This seems always to have been the law. The Court of Chancery, however, representing the King, as *parens patriæ*, has been held to have the right to control the father's right to the possession of his child. This final decision in the earlier part of the 19th century, after many conflicting decisions, received much public attention and disapproval. The City of London claims some immemorial right to the care of orphans of freemen; and as late as 1873 and 1891 special acts: the Judicature Act, the Infants Custody Act, and the Custody of Children Act, give the State the right of *Habeas Corpus* over infants and young persons, which seems to show that there was some uncertainty regarding the question.

The process by which the State assumed guardianship over its pauper children, which is by far its larger responsibility, is much more complicated, and has been reached through many changes and incidents in the history of the English people. For these changes and for this greater interference of the State, in assuming the paternal care of its youth, we must look to many causes, economic and industrial, to the abolition of the Religious and Craft Guilds, to the enactment of the first and subsequent Statutes of Labourers, which sent to prison large numbers, bond and free, who were not serving some person at wages fixed by the law. The later ones provided against idleness and begging, and refer to mendicancy as though it was a recognised profession, which it had apparently become after the flow of monastic charity had ceased, and included villeins, pilgrims and even poor scholars of the universities. By an early Vagrancy Act (1547) the children of beggars could be taken from them and put to some calling.

The apprentice system, an excellent substitute for parental care, gradually disappeared, especially that of apprentices living under the roof and care of their master. Various causes brought about an immense amount of hitherto unknown lawlessness, crime and misery, which the State felt bound to suppress rather than alleviate. A great deal that could have been dealt with under a better Poor Law or an Education System, was left almost entirely to be dealt with by the magistrates under the Criminal Law. This undoubtedly gave rise to the "Criminal Child," for there was little disposition to regulate habits and vices except through the Criminal Law. Crime and immorality increased, and the multiplication of the criminal population was the constant complaint during the two last centuries. This increase in London, Henry Fielding (the novelist) and his brother Sir John, the two

first Bow Street magistrates, strove to suppress by a better police system. The Criminal Justices Act (1855) gave the magistrates power to try cases more expeditiously; excessive and frequent punishments and floggings were largely resorted to, and a constant endeavour was made to inspire "awe" in the administration of justice. "Do you know I am a Judge?" asked a Scotch magistrate; "What's that?" replied the shrill voice of a small child offender. Juvenile crime increased by leaps and bounds. In 1852 in Newcastle, juvenile crime increased four times as fast as the population, and in England it doubled in thirteen years and increased faster than the adult criminal population. Private effort, voluntary and religious philanthropy struggled valiantly with this so-called "Child Criminality"; the Government did little or nothing to help except through the administration of the Criminal Law. Education received little or no encouragement by legislation. Secular national education belongs to the 19th century, although five hundred years before, Richard II. had rejected a proposition that villeins should be forbidden to send their children to learn "Clergie" or scholarship (Stubbs' Constitutional History). That education would unfit the poor for the life allotted them was the prevailing doctrine, until Scotland, Ireland and New England had its Government education, and Wales for a time its "circulating schools." With the advent in England of general education, crime of all kinds perceptibly diminished. Previous, however, to the Elementary Education and other Acts, attempts were made to establish a more paternal guardianship over the young. Jonas Hanway by his writings and efforts established a system of separate nurseries for workhouse children and obliged every London parish to keep a register of its "parish infants." Churchwardens and overseers could hire out pauper children under the Parishes Apprentices Acts. An Act gave mothers the custody of their children until seven years old, but only in 1886 was the guardianship of her lawful children given to the mother on the death of her husband, and she could for the first time appoint guardians herself. Conferences were held on the subject of juvenile delinquents; Preventive and Reformatory Schools were established. "Educational Imprisonment" it was called. In the great cities reforming influences were created by Shaftesbury in England, and Chalmers in Scotland. The Reformatory Schools Act and the Industrial Schools Act came in 1866, the Elementary Education Acts, Factory Acts and other Acts followed in quick succession.

Alongside all these efforts, the still ponderous waggon, loaded with the old Criminal Law has rolled on. The wording of statutes has been of more consequence than the want of physical stature; individual propensity has been more considered than contaminating influences, punishment more than reform.

Children under seven years cannot incur the guilt of felony; those under fourteen are presumed to have no guilty knowledge, unless the contrary is proved; those over fourteen take the full responsibility of all criminal acts. Sir James Fitz-James Stephen would have had the legal age of complete responsibility raised. (Stephen's "History of the Criminal Law.") In 1716 a mother

and her daughter, aged nine, were condemned to death. In 1816 a boy of ten years was sentenced to death.

The 20th century opens with attention awake to the whole subject. In 1901 the Youthful Offenders Act was passed giving magistrates power to avoid sending children or young persons to prison. In 1905 a circular was issued by the State Children's Association recommending Special Courts for the hearing of all cases against juvenile offenders. Mr. J. Courtenay Lord opened the Birmingham "Children's Court," with a system of probation officers and non-recording of convictions. The Home Office issued a circular to magistrates, embodying similar suggestions, and in some large cities similar courts have been established. Recently a remarkable document has been issued by the House of Commons through Mr. F. C. Wedgwood, M.P., showing the disposal of children and young persons under sixteen charged with offences, in regard to whom the opinion of the magistrates was asked (1) as to the value of a probation system, (2) as to what steps are taken to keep children and young persons from adults, the answers to which questions show some striking differences of opinion. The Probation of Offenders Act (1908) came into operation on January 1st of this year.

An attempt has been made in this paper, obviously incomplete, to show how the "Child Criminal" came to be a factor in English Jurisprudence. Future legislation and thought will doubtless decide that no child or young offender can be considered a criminal at law when under the age of sixteen; some Continental nations have already so decided. Many will advocate eighteen as the age limit, some twenty-one; all will recognise the importance of the subject. While "crime is what the Law decides to be crime," the future will not rest contented with what the lawyers in the long past declared crime to be. Scientists recognise a process of development in each individual similar to that of the whole of human society, the same upward progression, from the primitive type to the highest mental, moral and physical being. In the process of the individual life is to be found "the young human being, having a strong tendency to the lawless instincts of its savage ancestors." Should the laws for its higher development be still those adopted in the earlier development of human society, or are these as Mr. Herbert Samuel has said, "out of harmony with the more rational and more humane ideas, which have become general in recent years?" It is for the present century and Parliament to decide.

THOMAS RAWLING BRIDGWATER.

THE CONGRESS OF THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS.

It is now more than a generation since the late Prof. Max Müller lectured in 1870 at the Royal Institution on "The Science of Religion." In the following year the foundation of the English school of Anthropology was laid by Dr. Tylor in the publication of "Primitive Culture." Every student knows how vast and varied have been the labours of a long line of distinguished scholars during the subsequent decades. Wide is the panorama of beliefs, rites, customs, institutions, which the continuous investigation of the past, checked by careful comparison with the living present, has revealed. Whole civilisations have been recovered by the simple use of the spade; and the dim libraries of the East have yielded up the earliest records of religions which have won the faith and swayed the life of hundreds of millions. In the enormous mass of new material which poured in upon European investigators, the first task was to secure the actual record of the facts. Cuneiform tablets, Egyptian papyri, the inscriptions of Greece and Rome, the sacred texts of the religions and philosophies of India, China and Japan, must be collected and published. Much, indeed, had been already done, but much more yet remained to do. In the meantime, the attempt to found a Science of Religion fell into the background, and the Historical Method rose into prominence. At the same time attention was called to fresh elements in religion which had hitherto received but scanty notice. The spectacle which had first awakened comparative interest was the mythology of the Rig Veda; stress fell upon the forms of belief, the parallels of the imaginative interpretation of nature, and identities of name binding remote peoples into one great family. But the significance of religion lies less in its intellectual forms than in its social and moral influences: and new aspects came into view as the rules of sacred action were investigated, and the meaning of ritual and the control of custom were examined. The immense part played by religion in social evolution became more and more clear; travellers, administrators, missionaries, studied its living force among obscure tribes, or in communities of immemorial antiquity, and agreed in assigning to it a leading place among the chief factors of human development.

The need for organising this wide and far-reaching study was

first felt in France. When the Republic was gathering its forces together after the great *débacle*, M. Jules Ferry and M. Jules Simon resolved to found a chair for the History of Religions in the Collège de France. They appointed the distinguished French scholar, M. Albert Réville, whose brilliant series of lectures brought the labours of specialists within reach of the general public, and aroused wide-spread interest in the subject. By his side was his no less distinguished son, M. Jean Réville (who now so worthily occupies his father's chair), the editor of the first journal devoted to the new study, the *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*; and M. Guimet, the generous founder of the splendid *Musée Guimet*, and originator of the long series of *Annales* which bear its name. On occasion of the great exhibition with which France closed the nineteenth century, a number of Congresses assembled on the north bank of the Seine. At the initiative of these *savants* the Congress Hall was reserved during the first week of September for the meeting of the first Congress of the History of Religions.

It was a memorable gathering, less notable, perhaps, for the actual papers that were read, than for the conceptions that animated it, and the striking personalities who took part in it. Some of these have already passed away. Albert Réville, who filled the president's chair with so much dignity and grace, Auguste Sabatier, the philosophic theologian, Léon Marillier, the skilled interpreter of the lower culture, were among the chief promoters, and impressed on the Congress the breadth and sympathy of their own genius. The second meeting was held at Basle four years later, under the presidency of Prof. von Orelli, the author of a well-known *Religionsgeschichte*. Representatives were sent by several foreign governments, and a number of European and American Universities, while the total membership exceeded 300. At the close of the sessions the International Committee charged with the duty of arranging for the next place of meeting suggested that the Congress should be held at Oxford in 1908.

For this purpose a Committee of members of the University was early formed, the late President of Trinity, the lamented Prof. Pelham, taking a leading part. The Council of the University having, on the suggestion of the Vice-Chancellor, kindly reserved suitable rooms in the Examination Schools, the Local Committee, under the Chairmanship of Prof. Percy Gardner, have announced that the Congress will be held at Oxford from September 15th to 18th next. On the evening of the 14th, Prof. Gardner and Dr.

A. J. Evans will receive the members and their friends in the spacious galleries of the Ashmolean Museum. The representatives of British and Foreign Universities and Academies will be welcomed at the opening proceedings on the morning of the 15th, when the Hon. President, Prof. E. B. Tylor, will introduce the President of the Congress, the Rt. Hon. Sir A. C. Lyall, K.C.B. Following the precedents of previous Congresses, the sessions will be of two kinds. Addresses or lectures of wider import will be delivered at General Meetings, while papers of more technical character will be reserved for separate sections where they can be followed by discussion. As at Paris and Basle the Sections will be eight in number: i. Religions of the Lower Culture (including Mexico and Peru); ii. Religions of the Chinese and Japanese; iii. Religion of the Egyptians; iv. Religions of the Semites; v. Religions of India and Iran; vi. Religions of the Greeks and Romans; vii. Religions of the Germans, Celts, and Slavs; viii. The Christian Religion. This distribution is obviously mainly formed upon race-distinctions, and does not easily lend itself to special sociological treatment. But it may be hoped that the Committee engaged in providing for the General Addresses will not ignore this aspect of the subject; while Section i., which practically coincides with religious anthropology, will afford an ample field for its recognition.

It need only be added that Members' tickets, entitling to admission to all Meetings and Receptions, and to a copy of the Transactions, may be obtained from Messrs. Barclay & Co., Old Bank, Oxford (by cheque or postal order, £1. each). Ladies' tickets, entitling the holder to all similar privileges at the Meeting, but not to the Transactions, may be procured in the same way (10s. each). Offers of papers may be sent to either of the Hon. Secretaries, Dr. J. E. Carpenter, 109, Banbury Road, Oxford, or Dr. L. R. Farnell, 191, Woodstock Road, Oxford. It will greatly facilitate the work of the Committee if Members desiring to read papers will inform the Hon. Secretaries by May 31st. All papers should be sent in not later than August 1st. In arranging the business of the Congress it is obvious that the Committee must reserve the final decision concerning the reading and printing of papers, under the inevitable limits of time and space.

The Congress will adhere to the fundamental Rule adopted in Paris in 1900: *Les travaux et les discussions du Congrès auront essentiellement un caractère historique. Les polémiques d'ordre confessionnel ou dogmatique sont interdites.*

J. ESTLIN CARPENTER.

REVIEWS.

A DISCIPLE OF LE PLAY.

"The Growth of Modern Nations: A History of the Particularist Form of Society." Translated from the French of HENRI DE TOURVILLE, by M. G. LOCH. London: Edward Arnold. 12s. 6d. net.

THIS work of the late M. de Tourville, besides its intrinsic merits, is noticeable as the first of the many writings of the school of Leplay to be translated into English—an honour which has not yet fallen to the Master himself. M. de Tourville, however, is by no means a typical example of the school. It is the great merit of Leplay and of most of his followers to ground their theories on an extensive and careful collection of facts, and by a discriminating choice of typical instances, submitted to a minute but rationally conducted investigation, to unite the accuracy of the statistical method with the informing result of actual observation, to breathe the breath of life into the statistician's figures, and make his dry bones live. But in this method, there lurks a great danger. The foundation tends to become the goal. Facts are sought for themselves. Monograph follows monograph. The formulation of general laws is indefinitely postponed. And in the end, the enquirer is choked and smothered by the overwhelming mass of unconnected observations. The great truth is forgotten that Sociology like other sciences must advance by a series of hypotheses, each approximating more nearly to the truth, and every one in its turn serving to connect and co-ordinate the observations on which it is based. Now M. de Tourville is equally free from the merits and the dangers which are found in most of the writers of his school. He has a keen eye to general relations, an adventurous scientific imagination, and no inclination to particular enquiries. Accepting the general principles of social structure as dependent on industrial organisation put forward by Leplay, and carefully noting the effects of geographical environment, he proceeds in a single volume of less than five-hundred pages to sketch the whole history of Western Europe and the United States of America from the times of the Roman Empire to the present day, in what he considers the fundamental aspects of our civilisation. One characteristic of his method must be particularly noted. He quotes few authorities in support of his contentions. As he himself puts it: "The proof of my statements about the great social phenomenon which I am going to trace throughout its development will lie in the well known character of the facts, in their strict scientific sequence, and in the reader's own experiences, which will come to confirm them on all points." Such references as he gives, relate chiefly to apparent exceptions and social anomalies, or to cases in which he considers that the prejudices of previous writers have falsified the record. He thus follows the sound rule that the generalisations of Sociology should be drawn from the whole range of undoubted history, particular investigations being undertaken to confirm, invalidate or limit the theories formed on a wider basis. To this rule M. de Tourville has adhered throughout with the result that he has produced a book of surpassing interest which will supply matter for many careful investigations; but on some of the theories the book con-

tains, and especially on the great theory of all, the superiority and permanence of the particularist form of society, it is necessary still to maintain an attitude of reserve.

Briefly, his account of the rise of the Particularist Family is this. The Celtic shepherds made their way from East to West along the valley of the Danube. The Germans took a more northern route, and as the steppe narrows to the west of Berlin and the fertile lands meet, they were forced or persuaded to a life of agriculture. Thence, some went northward along the eastern shore of the Danish peninsula and settled in Southern Sweden and the adjacent islands. So far their migration had been in bodies and they had retained the patriarchal family and their other old institutions. But "among shepherds who have become intensive farmers the patriarchal system gradually weakens; a breach is made in the community by the capable members still more than by the others; instead of a swarm going forth at rare intervals, a constant emigration of capable individuals takes place." From Eastern Scandinavia, the more energetic members of a patriarchal society shaken by its own progress, passed to the Western slope, and exposed to the peculiar geographical environment of Norway, gave birth to that form of the family which still exists in England.

At first, they were fishermen; but fishing cannot supply all the wants of life. Passing along the sheltered channel which skirts the Norwegian coasts, the fisherman entered the still more sheltered waters of the fiords, and there gained "one of those corners of land fit for cultivation which are found far apart." On this, he established his isolated home, and reared his children apart from all other families and connected with the outer world only by his wherry. But from this situation two developments arose. The narrow estate which the cleft in the rock formed and which could not be extended, left no place for his sons. One might remain, who would in the end inherit the paternal homestead; the others must seek along the fiords for new homes for themselves. The paternal estate was necessarily indivisible. And as regards the daughters, they could receive no dowry. Their marriage would be no affair of the family. Each would marry of her own free choice and live in practical isolation in her husband's home. Hence we have the distinctive marks of the Particularist Family, the indivisible estate inherited by one son only, the other sons going forth to seek new fortunes outside the paternal home, and the normal family consisting of a single pair, united by free choice, and surrounded by their children only so long as those children were not of an age to form homes for themselves. It is the family as it still exists in this country.

This bald summary of the effects of the Norwegian environment on the Gothic stock gives little idea of the care and ingenuity with which M. de Tourville traces each element—the conformation of the coasts and the fiords, the habits of the fish, the products of the soil—and shows its effect in changing the original civilisation which the settlers brought with them from the eastern slope of the Scandinavian peninsula. It is a most brilliant and triumphant application of the geographical method to a fundamental problem of Sociology. And the next stage in the process by which this form of the family became so widely spread, is explained with almost equal success. As the sites for new homesteads along the fiords became exhausted, the more adventurous sought a new outlet. Passing down the west coast of the Danish peninsula, they reached the Saxon plain, which stretching far inland, forced those who had been sea-coast fishermen for

many ages to turn away from the sea. On islands of fertile soil rising above the floods, on banks of mud painfully won for agriculture from sea and marsh, these colonists formed their homes, as well fitted to preserve their type of family as the fiords were to produce it. They found the country almost uninhabited, and they were already in possession when Tacitus wrote. "They live," said he, "in isolated and scattered dwellings, which they erect wherever a spring or field or wood takes their fancy." From them came the Franks and the Saxons who carried the particularist family into Gaul and Britain.

Here at once a difficulty presents itself. It is admitted that the Franks and the Saxons came, not as the individual offshoots of the particularist family but as large organised bands. At the head of the Franks were the Merovingians and their trusts; at the head of the Saxons, the founders of the Anglo-Saxon Kingdoms. These were surely no products of the petty landowners of the Saxon plain. M. de Tourville admits this, and falls back on the Odinid theory expounded in *La Science Sociale* by M. Champault, a Lefebvian sociologist with a still more adventurous scientific imagination. According to this theory, Europe was in early times traversed by caravan routes from East to West. The spread of civilisation around the Mediterranean, made these routes run from South to North; and the Roman conquests still further diminished their importance. The leaders of the caravans would form associations similar to those of the traders of the Sahara in our own time. One leader is identified with Odin, afterwards deified as the God of Commerce, whose name is still borne among us by the fourth day of week. He had his seat in a great city near the Don, and in addition exploited mines in Pontus. Harassed by the victories of the Romans over Mithradates, he removed his business headquarters to the other end of his caravan route, and began to work the Swedish mines. The invasions of the barbarians were really directed by the Odinids—the successors of the caravan leaders, who sought to make up for the decay of commerce by the profits of pillage and exploitation. It was from the Odinids that Cerdic and Clovis and the Merovingian trusts sprung. Insufficient as may seem the evidence on which this amazing theory is founded, it certainly is in harmony with the account of the rise of civilisation in Scandinavia contained in Norse poetry. With regard to one point, Mr. H. Munro Chadwick whose work on "The Origin of the English Nation" was noticed in the January number of this Review, and whose method is entirely different from that of M. de Tourville, says: "Quite possibly even the families which eventually succeeded in establishing Kingdoms may not all have been of English blood"; and he insists that the Saxons were not "leaderless hordes united only by bonds of consanguinity."

The Frank carving out an estate for himself in Gaul was in a very different position to the petty farmer of the Saxon plain; but he had brought with him the same constitution of the family. With this, the method employed by the Romans in working their estates by gangs of slaves under the direction of a steward did not at all harmonise. On the contrary, the Franks originated the Manor, with its division into two parts, the Lord's domain and the holdings of the serfs, the one supplying produce to the Lord, the other labour. This in M. de Tourville's view was the central institution of feudalism, which triumphed under Charlemagne, the typical owner of great manorial estates. These estates were self-contained and isolated, each self-supporting with its own industries and its own government—the apotheosis of the particularist family,

involving the subordination of public to private life. But excellent as this organisation seems to M. de Tourville, it did not last. The peasants grew rich and commuted their services for fixed dues. The towns bought their emancipation. The Lords of the Manor sunk from directors of industry to receivers of fixed rents. Deprived of their local functions, and with their fixed incomes becoming less and less in purchasing power, they became crusaders and knight-errants and set up in Jerusalem and elsewhere formal copies of decaying feudalism. Such was the sordid origin of the great deeds of chivalry. But in this partial view, in this concentration on the industrial shell of society, we have one of the dangerous errors of the Leplayan school. A passing mention of the usefulness of the Feudal system as a means of defence against further inroads of the barbarians would really, if followed up, give the key to its rise and its decay. Nor is it possible to appraise medieval civilisation and leave the Catholic Church out of account. In M. de Tourville's work, there is one difficulty that is not met. No indication is given as to the relation between the Manor and the Village Community. The isolated estate with its Frankish Lord might represent a development of the particularist family. It is almost suggested that such a family in its isolation would be found also in the hut of the serf. But we know that over a great part of the territory occupied by the Franks, as over a large part of England, the serfs of the manor lived in a village, a tenement in which gave a right to a share of the strips in the common fields, and that isolated farmers and farmhouses were unknown. In spite of M. de Tourville's banter directed against the venerable M. Fustel de Coulanges and his fondness for Roman origins, is it not possible that though the Frank's own family was particularist and though to him the political isolation of the estate was due, yet he only imposed himself on a political organisation already existing? May not this account for the ease with which the particularist family was overthrown in France, and the French Monarchy erected on the ruins of Feudalism?

In his account of English civilisation, M. de Tourville distinguishes between the particularist Saxons and the patriarchal Angles; but unfortunately there is considerable evidence, marshalled by Mr. Chadwick in the work already mentioned, to show that the Angles and the Saxons had become one people before they ever reached England. The attempt to deduce the differences between the course of history in France and England from the greater strength of the particularist family in the latter must be pronounced unsuccessful. For instance, the failure of the French to rival the English at sea is surely more adequately explained by the existence of a land frontier in France which needed guarding than by the wickedness of that evil institution, the French Monarchy. It is true that the geographical environment has less influence on an established civilisation than on one that is undeveloped or decaying; but it is strange to find a follower of Leplay disregarding it altogether. No nation in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had sufficient resources to be strong at once on sea and land. La Hogue and Trafalgar alone rendered possible the campaigns of Marlborough and Wellington. Again, the greater prosperity of English agriculture during many centuries is attributed entirely to the superiority of English institutions, and not at all to the greater security of England's insular position in the ages immediately preceding. In this matter, time has not dealt kindly with M. de Tourville's argument. The particularist family still maintains its

position in England, but it would require some audacity to assert that English agriculture is more prosperous than French at the present time.

A general view of the whole book cannot fail to impress the reader with the boldness and extent of M. de Tourville's powers of generalisation and the perspicacity and insight which he shows in the application of his method; but it raises two fundamental doubts, one concerning his conclusions, the other concerning his principles. The first is evoked by his assertion of the permanent superiority of the particularist family, and the inferiority of a social system based on personal relations to one based on landed property. A consideration of M. de Tourville's own work suggests rather that the former system was temporary, and could only exist in its plenitude under circumstances such as those of Europe generally in the middle ages or of the still more peculiar circumstances which perpetuated the rule of the landed classes in England. Here is an illuminating passage:—

"Whatever slight variations there may have been, it nevertheless came about that from one end of France to the other the whole of the new population which the development of manufacture had caused to spring up in the towns escaped from the control of the domain and the control of the lord which the Franks had established. The strength that had been based on the estate was there replaced by a strength based on personal bonds, or the community."

In other words the Leplayan ideal of the subordination of public to private life proved then—and has proved more and more ever since—incompatible with the developments of modern industry. And in regard to the second point, is the key to modern progress to be found in changes of social structure due to changes in industrial organisation? That such a correlation exists, there can be no doubt; nor is it the least fruitful province of Sociological investigation. But in modern times at least the passage from one social phase to another has not been due solely to the slow decay of the industrial system characteristic of the earlier phase. There has been a continuous growth of modern science, precipitating and controlling the revolutions of industry. M. de Tourville himself says:—

"It is also easy to understand with what eagerness these manufacturers, who possessed all the Saxon fighting instincts, took up all the new mechanical and steam inventions which began to appear owing to the progress made by science."

Surely, then, "the progress made by science" is a vital element in determining the general evolution, even if it be not the very element which initiates the passage from one stage of civilisation to another. And surely this intellectual development should have a very much greater place in the study of Sociology than that assigned to it by the school of Leplay.

S. H. SWINNY.

EUGENICS.

"NOTEWORTHY FAMILIES." By Francis Galton and Edgar Schuster. John Murray.

"SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND POPULATION." By Alvan A. Tenney, Ph.D. Columbia University Press, New York.

"THE SCOPE AND IMPORTANCE TO THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE OF NATIONAL EUGENICS." Robert Boyle Lecture, 1907. By Karl Pearson. Henry Frowde.

"PROBABILITY: THE FOUNDATION OF EUGENICS." Herbert Spencer Lecture, 1907. By Francis Galton. Clarendon Press.

"AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF MENTAL AND SOCIAL MEASUREMENTS." By Edward L. Thorndike. The Science Press, New York.

Since Eugenics as a branch of scientific investigation was placed definitely before the public by Mr. Galton's Huxley Lecture, and his subsequent Memoirs given before the Sociological Society, publication in this department has been somewhat limited. This does not signify, however, that the energies of those interested in the subject have in any degree relaxed. Mr. Galton's first utterances, though based on many years of study, pretended to be no more than the outline sketch of a science; it was necessary that it should be filled in by detailed researches, this, not merely with reference to the immediate subject-matter of Eugenics, but with reference to the general application of biological principles to human beings. This preliminary work has been carried on largely by Professor Karl Pearson and his students, and the results have appeared from time to time in the pages of "*Biometrika*." The intimate relation of these studies to Eugenics proper has been emphasized by the fact that the Eugenics Foundation in the University of London has been placed under the supervision of Professor Karl Pearson.

The volume on "*Noteworthy Families*" is the first product of the University of London Research Fellowship in Eugenics. It consists of a study of sixty members of the Royal Society living in 1904 who possessed as many as three noteworthy kinsmen. The arrangement is alphabetical, and exhibits the various family relationships which are considered noteworthy. The surprising fact is made apparent that the scientific ability of the country, of the F.R.S. grade, comes from comparatively few family stocks, while the kinship of men able in other directions is no less pronounced. But perhaps the most valuable part of the book is the long preface contributed by Mr. Galton, which is in many respects the most comprehensive and lucid exposition he has yet given. He not only analyses the facts that come out of the study in hand, but provides the general background of principle. In the last few years many objections have been raised to the Eugenic proposals, but in view of the large and impartial exposition given in this preface, most of them seem trivial. The sections devoted to noteworthiness are especially to be commended, as also that dealing with the correlation of ability with environment.

Dr. Tenney's short treatise deserves mention in this connection as being the first attempt to relate the Eugenic principle to the general theory of society. The problem is a difficult one, and the book makes no pretension to have satisfied its requirements. Apart from the large gaps in our knowledge, the difficulty of correlating somewhat incongruous sets of results is so pronounced that no one can undertake more than a

preliminary triangulation of the field. Dr. Tenney's view of social democracy appears too limited and too much a reading from contemporary conditions in the United States. There is too much of flux in the social conditions of that country to bring them in close relation with relatively permanent biological laws. The value of the book lies then in its intent rather than its achievement. It states the problem of the relation of society to biology in such a way as to form a useful guide for investigators.

Professor Karl Pearson's Robert Boyle Lecture is a skilful propagandist presentation intended to affect opinion in that centre which originates the larger number of determining influences in national life, namely, Oxford University. For his purposes, Professor Pearson frankly treats Oxford as a Technical School whose objective is not the training of engineers or physicians, but statesmen. The question naturally arises as to what in the curriculum can most efficiently give preparation in statecraft. Philosophy, political economy, even anthropology, fail to be of great value in connection with the practical issues which determine the course and destiny of a nation. Prominent in a school of statecraft should be the study of those biological factors which affect races and which form, as Professor Weldon says, "the only legitimate basis for speculations as to their past history and future fate."

The lecturer proceeds to justify this contention by presenting in general outline some of the results already attained by the laboratory of national Eugenics. Examples of family history are given to show the hereditary character of ability on the one hand, and the forms of degeneracy on the other. But the full understanding and interpretation of such pedigrees require the use of a scientific instrument, hitherto only slightly applied in biological and human science. This method is the metrical, or statistical. It is not only important to know that human beings tend to retain certain characteristics through heredity, it is even more important to know the exact degree of this retention, and correspondingly of variation. Modern statistical methods are able to give the exact quantitative measure of likeness, or unlikeness, as between parents and children and between children of the same family. With coefficients of correlation established for the important physical and psychical characters, it is possible to apply these in an interpretation of rates of changes in the various divisions of the population. Attention is first given to the degenerate section. As a practical problem, the question is an old one, and the various expedients, from Plato's method of purgation of the State, described in the "Laws," down to recent times, have had the same character, namely, that of permitting the more or less efficient operation of natural selection. The stringent methods of dealing with the criminal and insane classes tended to save the community from corruption through perpetuating their kind, but in recent years these methods have radically changed and are now largely controlled by sympathy, itself an important acquisition of civilization, with the result that the degenerate section of the community is allowed to propagate practically without restriction. The consequences of these conditions are shown definitely by statistical studies already made. It has been proved by Messrs. Schuster and Heron and Professor Pearson that deaf-mutism, insanity and pulmonary tuberculosis are highly inheritable, the parental coefficient of correlation being in each case at or above .5. The significance of this fact appears when it is compared with the birth-rate among these classes, which is distinctly higher than that of normal persons. The only restriction of the character of natural selection is the death-rate, but since

only from half to three-quarters of the whole number of deaths are of a selective character, this does not compensate for the fertility of the unfit, and, moreover, it is not clear that the selective death-rate has less effect upon normal than upon abnormal sections. The result is that the heritage of degeneracy is constantly increasing, and the time must come when its proportion will be so overwhelming that the State could hardly survive a crisis.

But, while Eugenics brings this realization of danger to the national destiny, it equally suggests the mode of salvation. The inheritability of ability, physical and mental, is as well proved as that of degeneracy. It, therefore, becomes an ethical obligation to those inspired with an idea of national greatness to follow the method which Eugenic investigation has so abundantly proved, and contribute to the nation a stock, sound in body and in mind, if possible with its germinal quality and quantity increased, in order to make a race that can meet the emergencies which the future course of history may present.

In his *Probability: The Foundation of Eugenics*, Mr. Galton gives an outline of the theory of probability, and shows its simplest methods of application to Eugenics. It is his belief that the principles on which problems of probability are based can be taught in such a way as to be grasped by one ignorant of mathematics. To do this, he outlines a scheme of five lessons. The first lesson would explain variability of size, weight, number, etc., by presenting arrays of variates and showing how they fall into a continuous series. The second lesson would treat the idea of an array with more precision, by showing schemes of distribution and centesimal graduation of the base. The third lesson would proceed from variates to deviates and show the genesis of the theoretical normal curve and the use of the quartile. The fourth lesson would show the different forms of the curve of normal distribution, and the meaning of the curve of frequency, and its unit of variability, the standard deviation. The last lesson would deal with the measurement of correlation and the determination of the index of correlation. The last section of the lecture is concerned with the influence of collective opinion upon individual conduct. The individual is shown to be largely at the mercy of a series of customs, prejudices and other influences. Illustrations are given of how this body of controlling sentiment has changed in the past, and the probability is indicated that when Eugenics is sufficiently established on its basis of evidence it will alter the attitude of man toward matters affecting the quality of the race.

In connection with Mr. Galton's attempt to make available for non-mathematical students the more simple of the statistical methods used in Eugenic investigation, should be mentioned a book not yet well-known in this country, Professor Thorndike's "Theory of Mental and Social Measurements." For the inadequately trained student who desires to make use of statistical methods, this is one of the best introductory treatises in existence.

J. W. S.

"THE RISE OF THE GREEK EPIC." By Gilbert Murray. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

"LIFE IN THE HOMERIC AGE." By Thomas Day Seymour. New York: The Macmillan Company.

Whatever else the term Sociology may connote, it stands at least for Science as applied to the phenomena of society; whilst Science in its turn

stands at least for Method. Now here are two opposite methods of studying Homer: Dr. Murray's evolutionary, dynamic; Prof. Seymour's classificatory, static. Which of the two methods is the sounder? If the point of view taken be that of Sociology and Science, there can, I venture to think, be little doubt as to the answer. But this is, apparently, not the only point of view from which Homer and the Homeric Age may be studied. Prof. Seymour openly declares that his interest in the matter is not so much archaeological as philological.

Let anyone who wishes to compare the two methods place side by side Prof. Seymour's and Dr. Murray's chapters on Homeric arms and armour. Both authors have got hold of substantially the same facts. But what a difference in the use made of them! Not but what Prof. Seymour is forced by the facts themselves to recognise discrepancies; on the strength of which, as he is not unaware, problems of development suggest themselves as inevitably as when fossils of different epochs appear one below the other in the riven side of a Colorado cañon. But he is not interested in problems of development. Philology carefully collects the fossils, and proceeds to decorate a rockery with them. For Dr. Murray, on the other hand, the facts are something more than curious or pretty. They are full of infinite meaning; only make them speak, and what a tale might they unfold. It is a little hard, no doubt, on Prof. Seymour to pillory his work as an example of misguided method. This drawback allowed for, the work might be described as excellent of its kind—conscientious, thorough, and lucid. Here, however, where Sociology is our *parti pris*, no allowance of the sort can be made. Sociology is before all else a critique of methods, and is based on, nay, may almost be said to consist in, the methodological principle that man and his works must be studied in the light of, and for the sake of, the Whole.

Now no one dare accuse Dr. Murray of being in any way untrue to philology. His is primarily a literary interest; he is, in fact, giving us a first instalment of a history of Greek literature. But he is anxious to consider Greek literature from a new standpoint, which he explains, and, I think, successfully justifies, in his first lecture. He wishes to concern himself with it as it bears on "the service of man." For him to be classical is not to be dead, but to be alive. Hellenism is a form of the spiritual effort whereby man transcends mere animalism. "Allowing for indefinite differences of detail, there seems to be a certain primitive effortless level of human life, much the same all the world over, below which society would cease to be; a kind of world-wide swamp above which few nations have built what seems like permanent and well-weathered dwellings. Others make transient refuges which sink back into the slough. *La nostalgie de la boue*—'home-sickness for the mud'—is a strong emotion in the human race." We need not pause to enquire whether it is strictly true that savagery is always so spiritually effortless as Dr. Murray thinks; whether, in other words, he does not forget that seed may oftentimes lack the support of soil, soul the support of body, generous ideals the support of numbers, an abundant food-supply, defensible boundaries, and, above all, luck. Broadly and, perhaps, rhetorically speaking, however, we may say with Dr. Murray that there are only two kinds of man—man natural and man spiritual; and that Greece, notably by means of her literature, made spiritual man possible for Europe. Even by the time our 'Homer' came into existence the choice had already been made, the rights of man were declared, spirituality, civilization, σωφροσύνη, salvation—whatever we call it, the thing had come to stay.

To get his contrast, to show what the Hellenism of Homer negates, Dr. Murray next proceeds to describe what he effectively terms "the Dark Age"—the Age of the Migrations. I cannot pretend to judge whether his ethnological speculations are in accordance with the latest expert findings. For the immediate purpose in view it is enough, with him, to conceive 'Mycenean' civilization, such as it was—something at any rate non-Greek, since Greece in one sense was not yet born—going down, less perhaps by cataclysm than by gradual dissolution, before wave on wave of barbarian Northerners. Thereafter were the days of the Iron race deplored of Hesiod: "Their righteousness in their fists! And a man shall sack his brother's walled city." Before these Iron Men, according to Hesiod, flourished "the divine generation of the Heroes." According to Dr. Murray, the Seven against Thebes were Northerners turning back from Argos to destroy a stronghold of Orientals (Cadmus—the man from the East) that menaced their rear, whilst the fight for Troy was a struggle between an earlier and later set of Northern immigrants for a toll-gate commanding the traffic that was borne overland to avoid the currents round Sigeum. Suppose, then, Mycenean culture "sunk back into the slough," with barbarism in possession, dealing in nought but rude feats of arms and equally rude saga-songs about the fighting, and how is it that some centuries later Homer and Hellenism are in full-blown existence?

Dr. Murray asks us to imagine—the whole argument from first to last is addressed to the imagination, and rightly—the book of early times. It was not a thing to be given to the public. It was rather the private stock-in-trade of a professional story-teller who lived by his book. The great book of Michael Scott, the magician, was read by no man but one, and was buried in its master's grave. But conceive the book of a bard, instead of suffering so untimely a fate, handed on to a disciple who has learnt to interpret the difficult letter-marks. Behold it an heirloom, jealously guarded, and with each successive owner, with each successive great event in the history of the community, changed, expanded, expurgated. That, in a few words, is Dr. Murray's theory of Homer. The rest of this book consists in a detailed presentation of the proofs of such a progressive re-editing. Throughout a very suggestive analogy is employed, of which one has hitherto heard too little in this connection, namely, that of the growth of the Pentateuch. Here, too, it is plain, generations of revisers have been at work excising, contaminating, incorporating, and what not. As regards Homer the individual poet, he may apparently be identified with the author either of an earlier Aeolic or of a later Ionian version of the *Iliad* (not to complicate matters by introducing the question of the authorship of the *Odyssey*, a subject in which Dr. Murray appears to be somewhat less interested). In any case Ionia seems responsible for the final Hellenizing of the Epos. Dr. Murray believes that it was put together in its present form to be recited at some great Pan-Ionian festival. "One feels in the *Iliad* the high tension and lift of a great occasion—a public occasion, which insists on a tone of dignity and correctness in the poems, banishing all that is furtive or unseemly, all that could move derision in strangers or hurt the feelings of other Ionian States; inevitably, at the same time, somewhat blighting that profounder and more intimate venturesomeness of poetry which cannot quite utter itself before a crowd."

Enough, perhaps, has been said to illustrate the truly sociological and synthetic method of this live book. No doubt the specialists will detect slips here and there. One might, for instance, pick holes in some of the

anthropological suggestions that are put forward by the way. It is not given to any one man to bring all the specialisms into focus. But, as long as the informing principle is sound, the details will take care of themselves. One feels inclined to say that, even suppose a good part of its facts and hypotheses to be in course of time upset, Dr. Murray's work will remain well-nigh as stimulating as before, simply because it has Science.

R. R. MARETT.

"THE STOIC CREED." By William L. Davidson, M.A., LL.D., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Aberdeen, etc. Pp. xxiii., 274. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

This work appears in a series published by Messrs. T. and T. Clark under the general title of "Religion in Literature and Life." Professor Davidson has given an account, for the most part clear and trustworthy, of the history of Stoicism and its logical, physical, moral and religious doctrines. He illustrates his exposition by abundant quotations from Diogenes Laertius, Epictetus, Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, which bring the reader into direct contact with Stoic ideas. In general, the book may be described as suitable to the purpose of spreading a popular knowledge of Stoicism amongst serious and intelligent families.

Some inaccuracies or negligencies occur: the most serious, perhaps, in the account of the *consensus gentium*. The practical test of preconceptions or common notions, was, says Prof. Davidson, the general consent of mankind; and thereupon he appropriately quotes from Seneca: "For we are wont to lay much stress on the conception (*præsumptioni*) of all men, and among us it is regarded as an index of its truth, that a thing seems so to all: as, for example, that there are gods we infer, among other things, from this, that a belief in God is implanted in all men; nor is there any people so far outside the range of laws and morals as not to believe in some gods" (p. 69). Yet, at p. 81, he writes: "But by 'universal consent' the Stoics did not mean the consent of everybody throughout the world and throughout the ages, without exception. They quite well knew that there are people who will deny anything; and of such people they had ample experience in their own day. What they meant was that preconceptions are everywhere accepted when the mind is calm, clear, and unprejudiced—when, therefore, it is in the state that characterises the wise man." Is not this an unjustifiable gloss?

Our author's style is usually clear and intelligible, but not always by any means. Commenting, for example, on the failure of the Stoics to reconcile the fact of evil with their optimism, he says (p. 226): "There is no due appreciation in Stoicism of the fact that, as each individual is essentially a social being, the sufferings that he is called upon to endure are in great measure *vicarious*; and in cases where he suffers through others' faults or sins, his sufferings are of the nature of *atonement*, thereby reacting for good upon those whose wrong-doing entailed them. This is the philosophy of suffering that is implicated in the great truth of the solidarity of mankind, and that illumines much." For me, in spite of the italics, it only deepens the obscurity.

The sixth chapter, *The Epicurean Contrast*, gives an account of Epicureanism, which is commendably sympathetic. It may still be a popular notion that Stoicism and Epicureanism were the chief mutual opponents in later Greek Philosophy, but it seems better to consider them as complementary, offering alternative schemes for the rationalisation of life to men of different temperaments. The great opponent of both,

before whom both at last succumbed, was Scepticism; and it is a serious oversight on Prof. Davidson's part to have given hardly a reference to this powerful school. He thinks it necessary to refute the Stoics at many points, thereby giving his work almost an apologetic character; he criticises the sublimities and extravagances of Chrysippus or Seneca as if they were still in need of correction, much as Milton requires the doctrines of ancient moralists to be reduced "under the determinate sentence of David, or Solomon, or the Evangelists and Apostolic Scriptures." But how much more interesting it would have been to give the Sceptics' objections to Stoicism, that we might see how that philosophy appeared to contemporaries amidst the actual conditions, social and literary, of its existence at Athens or Rome, than it can be to tell us what it now looks like when its fossils are examined at Aberdeen!

What a student of Sociology most misses in this book is a just sense of the relation of Stoicism to history and anthropology; in fact, he finds this sort of shortcoming in nearly all histories of Philosophy. From some of them you might come away with the impression that Socrates had invented the immortality of the soul. In a perfunctory half-page (p. 60) Prof. Davidson assigns three causes of the growing importance of the idea of cosmopolitanism amongst the later Stoics: the spectacle of the Roman Empire, the growth of the theistic conception, and the corruption of the times. The first is a commonplace; the second and third themselves need explanation. But to these causes with others is due not merely the idea of cosmopolitanism, but the whole Stoic Philosophy, and the subject deserves a chapter. The history of Philosophy is an inseparable strand of universal history: treated in abstraction it is quite unintelligible. We know that in our own case problems are forced upon us, and the solutions we arrive at are greatly influenced, by the general movement of events, by institutions, by the sentiments of our neighbours. It was always so. The record of a thin line of greybeards repeating or contradicting one another, hides from students the actual conditions of thought and the great difference there is in the meaning of the same proposition as it was uttered 2,000 years ago, and as we understand it to-day. The history of Philosophy needs to be written with wider knowledge than the barren region of dialectic can supply, and quite as much as wide knowledge it needs imagination.

Prof. Davidson is puzzled by the Stoic acceptance of divination; it is, he thinks, "if divination be regarded in its purely superstitious aspect," irreconcilable with Fate, or "the conception of God as absolute law or order" (p. 230). But, on the contrary, Fate may be considered as a generalisation of the beliefs on which divination is founded, that there are such fixed relations amongst events that one is an infallible sign of another, though we may not be able to see any connection between them. Such beliefs are held by the most primitive folk, even such as have no religion, that is, no gods; and this greater antiquity of Fate may be the reason why, when gods came to be imagined, it is still superior to them. The Stoic acceptance of divination is characteristic of their conservatism in all such matters, in contrast with the Epicurean *Aufklärung*. The reconciliation of Fate with their doctrine of Providence is more difficult. Bacon notes it as a weakness of princes that they are apt to desire contradictories; and so it is in a measure with philosophers. And to explain the connections of all their doctrines we have to fall back upon Ribot's position, that the logic of sentiment does not recognise the principle of contradiction.

CARVETH READ.

"BRITISH FREEWOMEN: THEIR HISTORICAL PRIVILEGE." By C. C. Stopes.
Sonnenschein, 1907.

Into the heated atmosphere of controversy Mrs. Stopes' work comes with something of the effect of a cold douche. Here is to be found no sentiment about what is, or is not, ideally fit, suitable, or becoming for a woman to do; no discussion about abstract rights or the theoretical equality of the sexes. Mrs. Stopes asks what, in history, the position of women actually has been, what is our ancestral heritage of right?

Her argument, briefly and inadequately summarised, runs as follows: According to old tradition and the law of the land, under the Feudal system, sex in itself did not disqualify a woman from anything. There was no excusing a woman a duty, and consequently no denying her a privilege. The advantage granted her of "sending a deputy" she was allowed in common with men who were too old or infirm to bear arms. In ancient times even a married woman could be "free," both as an inheritor and as an earner; free to contract, to sign, to seal, to act as a *feme sole* (p. 20). "Through different principles of inheritance there have always been fewer heiresses than heirs; through the success of various devices protecting male professional and trade industries against female competition there have been fewer female owners of earned property"; thus representative freewomen have been always in a small minority. But there can be no doubt that women could be, and were, freeholders in towns by inheritance or by purchase; they could be free of companies, by patrimony, service, or payment; or by being widows of freemen. The rules varied, but in almost all the companies, at least in London, some women could be free. They could be free in other boroughs under the same conditions as men by paying brotherhood money, and by sharing in the common duties of burgesses; free in regard to the Corporation, and free as regards voting for members of Parliament. Of the causes that led to the lapse of women's privileges in these matters I must leave Mrs. Stopes to speak for herself; she notes that the process did not go on without protest (p. 135). And it was not till 1832 that any Act of Parliament had explicitly excluded women as such from the franchise, "freeholders" or "persons" being always indicated in "Representation of the People" Acts, without any reference to sex. In the Reform Bill of 1832 the word "male" was interpolated before "persons" in the newly-created boroughs. "Never before and never since has the phrase 'male person' appeared in any statute of the Realm." Thus for the first time in the history of the English Constitution women were technically disfranchised, though not as regards the older boroughs. In 1867 the Bill for the extension of the franchise made use of the word man instead of "male person." As, according to an Act of 1850, it had been declared that words importing the masculine gender shall be deemed to include females, except where otherwise stated, it would seem that the Act of 1867 did actually enfranchise the women who came within its scope. In Manchester over 5,000 women got themselves placed upon the register, and great uncertainty prevailed how to treat them. In most cases the revising barrister threw them out, but it would appear that in several cases women exercised their vote. In a law case, *Chorlton v. Lings*, which was instituted to ascertain the legal position of the women voters, the argument was used that no statute had taken their right away from

women, because they never had any. Judgment was given against the women on the ground that the right, not having been asserted for centuries, was a strong presumption against its ever having legally existed (p. 173). Mrs. Stopes' book is devoted to showing that this judgment was based on an inadequate knowledge of history and fact. It cannot be overlooked by those who desire to see the woman question in a true perspective. Mrs. Stopes has at least made it evident that the appeal to custom, history and tradition, is not all on one side.

B. L. HUTCHINS.

"AN INTRODUCTION TO CHILD STUDY." By W. B. Drummond, M.B., Assistant Physician to the Royal Hospital for Sick Children, Edinburgh. Author of "The Child: His Nature and Nurture." Pp. 344. Edward Arnold. 6s. net.

Child study, beginning with the teacher, soon spreads to the physician; to-day students of Sociology and of politics are turning to it for help in understanding the conditions and laws of human life and development. Also "the philologist turns to baby linguistics," and "the anthropologist, unable to discover a living specimen of primitive man, turns to the child as his nearest representative." Hence this book should find a welcome in many quarters.

The title describes very truly the aim and scope of the book, it lays a foundation for a science of 'genetic psychology,' rather than provides a manual of the material already collected by child studies to quote the writer: "We must begin with the simplest things, and make sure our knowledge of foundations before seeking to understand the more complex phenomena which grow from them." The first ninety pages form a propædæutic to child study generally, discussing such subjects as "Biology and Child Study," "Caution in Child Study," "Methods of Child Study." The next hundred are given to physiological questions concerning babies and the growth and health of children; "Instincts," "Habits," "Forms of Expression" and "Moral Characteristics" take another hundred; then come two brief chapters on "Religion and the Child," and on "Peculiar and Exceptional Children."

The treatment of the subject is eminently sane and well balanced, statistics and facts are supplied where they are required, but details and instances more attractive to the general reader are not excluded. The following is an example of the writer's style: "All mental phenomena develop through an ascending series of stages, and on the capitalisation of our acquisitions by habit depends the possibility of the passage from stage to stage. The development of feeling in the form of sense-perception brings the child to a knowledge of the outside world, to the formation of ideas and so to his intellect. . . . Acts which have been reflex and instinctive are learned, understood, chosen deliberately, and, it may be, forged by frequent repetition into habits—habits which may be performed as automatically as instincts, yet carry with them the moral value of acts of will."

M. E. FINDLAY.

"WHAT IS RELIGION?" By Wilhelm Bousset, Professor in the University of Göttingen. Translated by F. B. Low. London: T. Fisher Unwin, Adelphi Terrace, 1907.

A series of popular, historical lectures on the Religion of Savages, National Religions, the Religion of the Prophets, of the Law (Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Islamism) and of Redemption (Buddhism, Platonism and Christianity).

The treatment of Buddhism is particularly admirable for the simplicity and the directness with which its fundamental ideas are expressed. In the final lecture, on the Future of Christianity, it is declared that the Pauline-Lutheran conception of Christianity with its belief in Special Inspiration, Divinity of Christ, Atonement, Miracles, is doomed, but that Christianity will survive in a form no longer antagonistic to modern culture, namely, the Christianity of Christ himself.

J. H. LEUBA.

PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS.

COST OF LIVING OF THE WORKING CLASSES.

(Cd. 3864, 1908.)

This inquiry was undertaken in order to supplement the two well-known "Fiscal Blue Books," cd. 1761 (1903) and cd. 2337 (1904), and is partially based on returns there given as to working-class expenditure on rent, food and fuel, and the proportion which that expenditure bears to the total income. Two similar reports are in preparation, dealing with France and Germany, and the data, when completed, will serve (1) as a basis for a comparison of working-class conditions in the various districts of the United Kingdom, and for the study of local variations in wages and in the cost of living; (2) as a standard for comparison with foreign countries; (3) as a standard for comparison over a period of years for the same localities and countries, should such enquiries be repeated.

The 1904 report showed that, in spite of a rise in rent, fuel and light, between 1880—1900, the whole cost of living during the period fell, as shown in the following table :—

COST OF LIVING OF WORKING CLASSES.

(The year 1900 = 100.)

Period.						Index number of cost of living.
Average of Quinquennial period of which the middle year is 1880						... 120.5
"	"	"	"	"	"	1885 ... 108.2
"	"	"	"	"	"	1890 ... 100.9
"	"	"	"	"	"	1895 ... 95.5
"	"	"	"	"	"	1900 ... 99.7

The chief advantage of the 1908 over the 1904 report, is, that the later investigation covers 73 large towns in England and Wales instead of only 20, and that the standard adopted is now definite, the index numbers being calculated on the basis of the middle zone of London (excluding the outer suburbs and the business portion of the town) as 100.

With regard to prices it is shown that there are 9 towns above London (100) and 63 below. The total range lies between Dover (106) and Stockport and Wigan (88).

Geographically, the lowest mean index number for groceries, coal and meat combined, is Lancashire and Cheshire (92), the highest is the Southern Counties (102). Broadly speaking prices are high in the north, lower in Yorkshire, Lancashire and the Midlands, and rise again in the South and East.

To obtain the resultant cost of living the index numbers of rents and prices are combined.* Rent is given a weight of 1 and prices of 4. London (100) is at the head of the list because of its high rents, Croydon (99) is high because of its proximity to London, Dover (96) is third because of its high prices (106, while its rent is 56). The broad result is to show that there is very little difference between the majority of towns with regard to the cost of living. Thirty-eight of the seventy-three towns are included in the range between 85 and 90, and fifty-two between that of 84 and 92.

* The cost of clothing, which was included in the 1904 table given above, is not mentioned.

In order to compare the weekly rates of wages, four trades were chosen which are represented in nearly all of the towns—building, engineering, printing (hand compositors only), and furnishing. In the case of bricklayers there is seen to be great variation as only 37 out of the 72 towns selected came within the “predominant range” of wages (*i.e.*, from 37s. 6d. to 40s. 6d., whilst in the furnishing trade (French polishers) 33 out of 35 towns were included in the range. Taking London as 100, the index numbers for skilled labour are seen to vary between Croydon (105) and Bedford and Dover (64). Unskilled labour varies between Croydon (110) and Swindon (74).

An attempt is made to discover the approximate level of real wages by obtaining a ratio between money wages and cost of living. This is done by taking the mean of the index numbers of the groups of wages in each district and dividing it by the combined index number of rents and prices. The result does not indicate any general law of connection between local variation of wages and of the cost of living, indeed, in the two districts where wages are the highest—Lancashire and Cheshire 104, and the Midlands 100—the rents and prices combined are respectively 84 and 85, which are the lowest of all. It must, however, be remembered that the selected trades were few in number, and that only the standard rate of wages has been given.

D. SHENA POTTER.

Sixty-ninth Annual Report of the Registrar-General of Births, Marriages and Deaths in England and Wales (1906), Cd. 3833.

This Report is of course one of the indispensable documents for the student of contemporary sociological changes. From its masses of information we extract one or two salient items. The chief of these is the continued fall in the birthrate. This rate reached its highest recorded point, *viz.*, 36·3 per 1000 living in 1876; since then it has fallen by successive stages to 27·1 in 1906. The fall is general. Reckoning the proportion of legitimate births to 1,000 wives, aged between 15 and 45, we get the following changes in the 20 years 1880—2 to 1900—02.

The Netherlands	-9·3	Spain	+0·4
Norway	-3·7	Belgium	-19·8
Prussia	-7·1	England and Wales	-17·7
Ireland	+2·3	France	-19·7
German Empire	-8·4	Queensland	-23·2
Austria	+0·8	Western Australia	-23·9
Scotland	-12·7	South Australia	-28·0
Italy	-2·5	N. S. Wales	-30·6
Sweden	-8·2	Victoria	-24·2
Switzerland	-6·4	New Zealand... ..	-24·5
Denmark	-9·8		

Taking the proportion of illegitimate births to unmarried women of the same ages the ratio has fallen by 44 per cent. in England and Wales since 1876.

The death-rate showed a rise of 0·2 per 1,000 on 1905, the lowest recorded, but was 1·4 below the mean of 1896—1905.

The following abbreviated table shows the movement :—

Mean Annual Death-rate per 1,000 living.	
1876—80	20·79
1881—85	19·40
1886—90	18·89
1891—95	18·71
1896—1900...	17·69
1900—05	16·00
1906	15·38

In the forty years ending in 1900, though the death-rate for all ages fell by about 15 per cent., "no such corresponding reduction could be recorded" in the deaths of children under 12 months. Since the beginning of the century there has been a change for the better, which the Report holds "may fairly be ascribed" in part to the effect of an awakened public opinion. The rate is subject to wide fluctuations, "mainly caused by variations of summer temperature and rainfall." For the years 1896—1900 it was 156 per 1,000 births; for 1900—05 it was 138, for 1906 it was 132. The variation according to countries is great, ranging from 84 per 1,000 in Wiltshire to 157 in Lancashire.

In order to compare the weekly rates of wages, four trades were chosen which are represented in nearly all of the towns—building, engineering, printing (hand compositors only), and furnishing. In the case of bricklayers there is seen to be great variation as only 37 out of the 72 towns selected came within the "predominant range" of wages (i.e., from 37s. 6d. to 40s. 6d., whilst in the furnishing trade (French polishers) 33 out of 35 towns were included in the range. Taking London as 100, the index numbers for skilled labour are seen to vary between Croydon (105) and Bedford and Dover (64). Unskilled labour varies between Croydon (110) and Swindon (74).

An attempt is made to discover the approximate level of real wages by obtaining a ratio between money wages and cost of living. This is done by taking the mean of the index numbers of the groups of wages in each district and dividing it by the combined index number of rents and prices. The result does not indicate any general law of connection between local variation of wages and of the cost of living, indeed, in the two districts where wages are the highest—Lancashire and Cheshire 104, and the Midlands 100—the rents and prices combined are respectively 84 and 85, which are the lowest of all. It must, however, be remembered that the selected trades were few in number, and that only the standard rate of wages has been given.

D. SHENA POTTER.

Sixty-ninth Annual Report of the Registrar-General of Births, Marriages and Deaths in England and Wales (1906), Cd. 3853.

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In the forty years ending in 1900, though the death-rate for all ages fell by about 15 per cent., "no such corresponding reduction could be recorded" in the deaths of children under 12 months. Since the beginning of the century there has been a change for the better, which the Report holds "may fairly be ascribed" in part to the effect of an awakened public opinion. The rate is subject to wide fluctuations, "mainly caused by variations of summer temperature and rainfall." For the years 1896—1900 it was 156 per 1,000 births; for 1900—05 it was 138, for 1906 it was 132. The variation according to countries is great, ranging from 84 per 1,000 in Wiltshire to 157 in Lancashire.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL. Vol. xviii, No. 69.—W. H. Beveridge : *Public Labour Exchanges in Germany*. Labour Exchanges have multiplied rapidly in the last four years. The number of situations filled by them increases and now bears a considerable proportion to the whole population. But they are still only at the beginning of their development. Professor T. N. Carver : *A Suggestion for a new Economic Arithmetic*. Edgar Harper : *Will the Rating of Land Values increase urban congestion?* Combats views of Major Darwin and Dr. Cannan. The proposed system would stimulate building on the outskirts of towns, not in the centre. It would also stimulate agriculture. Professor E. C. K. Gonner : *Some Considerations about Interest*. The motives and methods of provision for the future are various and it is not clear that interest is socially essential to stimulate the adequate provision of capital for industry. Professor S. J. Chapman : *Laws of Increasing and Decreasing Returns in Production and Consumption*.

THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS. Vol. xxii, No. 2.—T. N. Carver : *Machinery and the Labourer*. The labourer has gained something in wages through the introduction of machinery, but less than other classes. On the other hand in the nature of his work he has probably gained more. A. P. Andrew : *Hoarding in the Panic of 1907*. Between August and December more than 230 millions of currency disappeared from the banks. No such general suspension of payments has occurred in England since the Napoleonic wars.

THE YALE REVIEW. Vol. xvi, No. 4.—Henry C. Emery : *Some Lessons on the Panic*. Discusses causes of financial crisis, indicates modifications of accepted opinions. Increased power of clearing house associations, provision of adequate means for contraction and redemption in bank issues are suggested as preventive methods before emergency.—Maurice H. Robinson : *The Legal, Economic, and Accounting Principles involved in the Judicial Determination of Railway Passenger Rates*.

RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE SOCIALI E DISCIPLINE AUSILIARIE. L. Mietta : *Il contratto collettivo di lavoro et le associazione operaie*.—A survey of the growth of collective bargaining in England, the United States, Germany, and France. E. Vercesi : *Verso un ordine cristiano sociale*. An account of the efforts of the Marquis La Tour-du-Pin to promote Christian Socialism. The French Revolution engendered a ruthless Individualism. A Counter-Revolution is needed to re-establish corporate action, in the spirit of "Christian justice." P. A. Palmieri : *La questione rutena nella Galizia*. M. Chiri : *Il lavoro dei fanciulli nell' industria in Italia*.—Statistics as to child-labour.

REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE. Vol. xvi, No. 1.—Victor Paraf : *Les hôtels pour la classe ouvrière*. An account of the Rowton Houses, and of similar institutions in Birmingham, Liverpool, Glasgow, New York and Milan. The writer concludes with the aspiration that some philanthropist may endow France with similar institutions.—René Maunier : *Vie religieuse et vie économique*. Specialisation in industries arises from the clan organisation. The clan on losing its family character becomes a caste. The first organised profession is the priesthood, from which others arise by differentiation. In the civilised world differentiation increases while exclusiveness diminishes.—Société de Sociologie de Paris. Paper by Dr. Paul Hartenberg : *Les types professionnels : le boursier*. Study of the moral atmosphere of the Bourse. Its frequenters are good "fathers of families," easy going and generous, but essentially gamblers and in public matters unscrupulous.

xvi:2.—G. Aslan : *Le problème moral au XIXe siècle*. How the question of re-establishing morality on rational foundations was conceived by Comte and other thinkers of the last century.—René Maunier : *Vie religieuse et vie économique* (concluded). Primitive specialisation is based not on the natural choice of individuals but on religious conceptions of the nature of things; in these conceptions there is a collective tradition which is the really operative force.—Société de Sociologie de Paris. Paper by Maurice Wolf : *Les types professionnels; l'instituteur*. A sketch of the changes in the position of the teacher from the *ancien régime* to the present day; a short discussion of the present attitude of the profession.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. Vol. xvi, 1.—Emile Boutroux : *William James et l'expérience religieuse*. Questions the possibility of detaching religious experience from concrete beliefs and institutions. M. Winter : *Sur la Logique du Droit*. P. Bureau : *Le droit de grève et la liberté du travail*.

LA LECTURA. REVISTA DE CIENCIAS Y DE ARTES. Vol. viii, No. 86.—Adolfo Posada : *Sobre la definición de la Sociología*.

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOZIOLOGIE. Vol. xxxi, No. 4.—Paul Barth : *Die Soziologie Albert Schäffles*. An appreciation of Schäffle's position in Sociology. Society is a spiritual organism, and it is a fundamental error in Schäffle to have included the material environment and forms of property within the sphere of Sociology. Nevertheless, he has done valuable service to the idea of a sociology grounded on history.

REVISTA ITALIANA DI SOCIOLOGIA. Anno xi, Fasc. vi.—G. Sergi : *Intorno alla monogenesi del linguaggio* : Combats Prof. Trombetti's theory of an "Ursprache." He rejects the specific unity of mankind on anthropological grounds, and argues that linguistic affinities, far from implying a common origin, are the result of endless mixing and combination between different forms of speech.—F. Tönnies : *La scienza economica e la filosofia*. Asserts that the tendency of the day is to treat economic problems in a more philosophic spirit, i.e., the postulates of Economic Science are critically examined; its problems are brought into relation with those of the other branches of Sociology; and the direction of future advance is thought out in the light of an ideal.—A Vago : *L'amministrazione finanziaria nella repubblica di Venezia*.

ANTHROPOS. INTERNATIONALE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VÖLKER—U. SPRACHKUNDE. F. G. A. Morice : *The Great Déné Race*. Their dress and personal habits. Mental and moral characteristics. Contrast between the ferocious Apaches and the "Hares" or Chepewyans. P. J. Caius : *In the land of caste* (Bibliography). C. von Coll : *Marriage among the natives of Turinam*. Fr. Aeg. Müller : *Soothsaying among the Kaffirs*. The witch-doctor's dance. How far soothsayers believe in their own powers. P. E. Rougier : *Maladies and Remedies in Fiji, formerly and to-day*.—Demonolatry, Ancestor-worship, Animal-worship, Fetishism. P. M. Friedrich : *Description of the burial of a chief at Ibonzo* (Niger). P. V. M. Egidi : *The Kuni Tribe* (New Guinea). L. Cadiéri : *Popular Philosophy in Annam*. Dr. Casartelli : *Hindu Mythology*. L. Levistre : *Dolmens in Algeria*.

MAN. Vol. viii, No. 2.—Dr. J. G. Frazer : *The Australian Marriage Laws*. Professor Westermarck : *The Killing of the Divine King*. In Morocco it is not the spirit of the king, but his holiness which passes to his successor. It may be that the killing of an old or failing king has the object of transferring his holiness unpolluted. R. H. Matthews : *Social Organisation of the Ngeumba Tribe, New South Wales*. Marriage cycles and genealogical tables. No. 3. A von Gennep : *Questions Australiennes*. Dr. A. C. Haddon : *Regulations for obtaining a Diploma of Anthropology in the University of Cambridge*.

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 Stopes, Charlotte C. *British Freewomen*. Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., 2s. 6d.
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 Castberg, P. H. *Production: a Study in Economics*. Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., 10s. 6d.
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- Dowd, Jerome. *The Negro Races. A Sociological Study*. Vol. I. The Macmillan Co. 10s. 6d. net.
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- Morgan, Lewis H. *Ancient Society*. Henry Holt & Co., New York.
- Report on the National Conference on Sweated Industries. Scottish Council for Women's Trades, 1s.
- Kidd, Benjamin. *Principles of Western Civilisation*. Macmillan, 5s. net.
- Fordham, Montague. *Mother Earth. A proposal for the permanent reconstruction of our country life*. Simpkin, Marshall & Co., 5s. net.
- Urwick, E. J. *Luxury and Waste of Life*. J. M. Dent & Co., 4s. 6d. net.
- Burrows, Herbert, & Hobson, John A. *William Clarke: a Collection of His Writings*. Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., 7s. 6d.
- Persona. *A New Gospel*. Privately printed, New York, 75 cts.
- Sutherland, William. *Old Age Pensions: In Theory and Practice, with some Foreign Examples*. Methuen, 3s. 6d. net.
- Hobson, John A. *The Problem of the Unemployed: an Enquiry and an Economic Policy*. Methuen, 2s. 6d.
- Money, L. G. Chiozza. *Riches and Poverty*. Methuen, 1s. net.
- Gomme, George Laurence. *Folklore as an Historical Science*. Methuen, 7s. 6d. net.

NOTICES.

At the Annual General Meeting of the Sociological Society held at 24 Euckingham Street, Strand, on Monday, April 6th, Sir Edward Brabrook, C.B., was elected President of the Society for the coming year and Mr. S. H. Swinny, Chairman of Council. The vacancies on the Council were filled by Sir C. Lewis Tupper, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Mr. P. J. Hartog, Mr. George Montagu, Mr. R. H. Tawney, and Mr. G. A. Touche.

The following papers have been read at meetings of the Society during the past quarter :—Dr. Robert Hutchison on "Infant Mortality" (the second of a series on Medico-Sociology), January 20th; Mr. I. Gibbon on "Past and Future Developments of Human Societies," February 3rd; Mr. S. K. Ratcliffe on "Aspects of the Social Movement in India," February 17th; Dr. Albert Wilson on "Psychology of Crime," March 9th; Principal Jevons on "Magic," March 23rd; and Professor Graham Brooks on "Recent Phases of Race Contact in the United States," April 6th.

The following meetings have been arranged for the remainder of the session : Sir C. Lewis Tupper, "Sociology and Comparative Politics," on Monday, May 4th, and Mr. E. J. Urwick, "Sociology in Relation to Social Progress," on Monday, May 11th.